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I. INTRODUCTION
Funding small businesses while complying with applicable securities
laws and regulations is tricky. Businesses need money to commence and
sustain operations, but most non-bank funders desire to subscribe for
interests in the firm that are deemed securities, invoking the possibility that
federal or state securities laws regulate the transaction. Under federal law,
an offer or sale of securities must be registered unless the security or the
transaction is exempt.
For many qmall businesses, the cost of complying with applicable
regulatory requirements outweighs the benefits associated with the
proposed financing method. Small firms-even those with good ideas and
sustainable business plans-either never get their fair shake in obtaining
start-up funds, or fail because they cannot finance the continued operation
or growth of the business. There must be a better way.
A promising web-based funding model for small business firms (and
potentially for larger enterprises) has emerged over the past few years.
Crowdfunding, as this model has come to be known, has been defined and
described in various ways.2 A recent article explains crowdfunding as
follows:
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
2. See, e.g., JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS
Driving Business 281 (2008) [hereinafter HOWE, CROWDSOURCING] ("Crowdfunding taps the
collective pocketbook, allowing large groups of people to replace banks and other
institutions as a source of funds."); Kristina Dell, Crowdfunding, TIME.COM (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1838768,00.html (describing crowdfunding as "[o]ne part social networking and one part capital accumulation"). Some define
crowdfunding to exclude websites that promise to pay profit sharing to the funders. See
Kieran Masterton, How to Crowdfund Your Startup, THINK VITAMIN (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://thinkvitamin.com/web-industry/how-to-crowdfund-your-startup/ ("[R]ule number one
of Crowdfunding is that you don't offer a percentage of your venture as a reward.").
Crowdfunding is sometimes confused or conflated with crowdsourcing, which also is a
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The concept of crowdfunding finds its root in the broader concept of
crowdsourcing, which uses the "crowd" to obtain ideas, feedback and
solutions in order to develop corporate activities. In the case of
crowdfunding, the objective is to collect money for investment; this is
generally done by using social networks, in particular through the Internet
(Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin and different other specialized blogs). The
crowd-funders (those who provide the money) can at times also participate
in strategic decisions or even have voting right. In other words, instead of
raising the money from a very small group of sophisticated investors, the
idea of crowdfunding is to obtain it from a large audience (the "crowd"),
3
where each individual will provide a very small amount.

Crowdfunding includes a variety of business financing models that use
the Internet.4 As we use the term in this article, crowdfunding involves
using a web-based business enterprise to seek and obtain incremental
venture funds from the public using a website (which we refer to as a
"crowdfunding website") to connect businesses or projects in need of
funding (which we refer to as "crowdfunded ventures") with potential
funders.' While some crowdfunding websites specialize in a particular
crowdfunded venture or type of crowdfunded venture, others are more
poorly defined term. Jeff Howe, the apparent originator of the term, defines it broadly to
include collaborative online business ventures of many kinds, where the power of the
Internet is harnessed to substitute the public for employees, creating a new type of labor
market. See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006),
[hereinafter Howe, Rise of
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html
Crowdfunding]. One commentator connects the two terms by offering that "[tihe term
crowdfunding derives from another neologism: crowdsourcing, i.e., outsourcing to the public
jobs typically performed by employees." Dell, supra. Yet another includes a crowdfunding
website, Aswarmofangels.com, in his list of crowdsourcing "efforts," implying that
crowdfunding is a type of crowdsourcing. Jessi Hempel, Tapping the Wisdom of the Crowd,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 18, 2007, 11:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com
Jeff Howe agrees, noting that
/innovate/content/jan2007/id20070118_768179.htm.
"crowdfunding has more in common with other forms of crowdsourcing than is immediately
apparent." HOWE, CROWDSOURCING, supra, at 247.
3. Paul Belleflamme et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd 2 (Feb. 21,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-1578175.
4. See KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION 1 (2010)
("[Tihe true social vibrance of crowdfunding is difficult to capture in a definition. The
crowdfunding space is quite diverse, comprised of many niches, and shares a lot of social
networking's energy."); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws
9-17 (Oct. 7, 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract=1916184 (accepted for publication in the
Columbia Business Law Review) (describing various different models).
5. This definition is not vastly different from the one constructed by the authors of
the article cited supra note 3. These authors define crowdfunding, based on the fifty-one
examples they reviewed, as involving "an open call, essentially through the Internet, for the
provision of financial resources either in form of donation or in exchange for some form of
reward and/or voting rights in order to support initiatives for specific purposes."
Belleflanme et al., supra note 3, at 6.
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general. A chart identifying and describing a number of crowdfunding
websites is included as Table 1.6
We became interested in this venture finance model because it has huge
appeal in a number of obvious respects, yet we could not understand how
some of the crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures (especially
those offering profit-sharing interests to funders) were complying with
federal securities laws.' This article is the result of our study of these firms
in that context and includes both descriptive and normative observations. It
is clear that some but not all manifestations of the crowdfunding model
result in the offer and sale of interests that are securities under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act").8 Because the
offers and sales are neither registered nor exempt from registration as
required under the Securities Act, these crowdfunded ventures are at risk.
They are the focus of the analysis and prescriptions we offer here.
We are not alone in our engagement with the federal securities law
aspects of crowdfunding. Among others, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the U.S. Congress have taken an interest in
crowdfunding. In an April 2011 letter to the Chairman of the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives,
SEC Chairman, Mary Schapiro expressly mentions crowdfunding as a new
capital-raising strategy.9 She further indicates that the SEC has been
6. Table 1 features websites in existence as of the date we completed this article,
unless otherwise expressly noted.
7. We focus in this article on the federal laws and regulations governing securities
offerings-most specifically the Securities Act and rules that the SEC adopted under it. We
note here, however, the potential applicability of aspects of broker-dealer, investment
advisory, or exchange regulation and state securities (or "blue sky") laws and regulations.
See Bradford, supra note 4, at 30-51; Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding, Social Networks,
and the Securities Laws-The Inadvisability of a Specially Tailored Exemption Without
Imposing Affirmative Disclosure Requirements 6, 15-16 (Nov. 18, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1954040; C. Steven Bradford, Peer-toPeer Lending, Crowd-funding, and Securities Law, Bus. L. PROF. BLOG (June 17, 2011),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2011/06/peer-to-peer-lending-crowd-funding
-and-securities-law.html [hereinafter Bradford, Peer-to-PeerLending]. We also note that the
possibilities and perils of crowdfunding cross state borders internationally. While this is
extremely important, it is part of a larger issue in international (and especially Internet)
securities offerings that this article does not attempt to resolve. At various points throughout,
however, as relevant to our analysis, we reference crossover issues under other federal, state,
and intemational law. And finally, although we note in several places the possibility of other
regulatory schemes (notably, the regulation of gambling and charitable solicitations), this
article does not address in any meaningful way the possible application of these other
potential sources of regulation.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2006).
9. Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n to The
Honorable Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, Comm. On Oversight & Gov't Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives (Apr. 6, 2011), at 22-24, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-
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engaged with industry participants, and is focusing on how to address
regulatory concerns relating to crowdfunding.10 Later, in testimony before
that House Committee, Chairman Schapiro echoed many of the same
themes from the letter, without expressly mentioning crowdfunding:'"
I recently asked the staff to take a fresh look at our offering rules in light
of changes in the operation of the markets, advances in technology and the
acceleration in the pace of communications. I also requested that the staff
think creatively about what the SEC can do to encourage capital
formation, particularly for small businesses, while maintaining important
investor protections. Areas of focus for the staff will include:
*
*
*

*

the restrictions on communications in initial public offerings;
whether the general solicitation ban should be revisited in light of
current technologies, capital-raising trends and our mandates to
protect investors and facilitate capital formation;
the number of shareholders that trigger public reporting,
including questions surrounding the use of special purpose
vehicles that hold securities of a private company for groups of
investors; and
regulatory questions posed by new capital raising strategies.

In conducting this review, we will solicit input and data from multiple
sources, including small businesses, investor groups and the public-atlarge. The review will include evaluating the recommendations of our
annual SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation, as well as suggestions we receive through an e-mail box we
recently created on our website. In addition, I expect our efforts to benefit
from the input of the new Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging
Companies the Commission is in the process of forming, which will
provide a formal mechanism for the Commission to receive advice and
recommendations about regulatory programs that affect privately held
small businesses and small publicly traded companies.12
Federal legislative interest followed. First, in early November 2011,
the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Entrepreneur Access to
Capital Act, H.R. 2930,13 which had been introduced in September 2011.
letter-04061 1.pdf [hereinafter Issa Letter]; see also C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and
the SEC, Bus. L. PROF. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business
law/2011/04/crowdfunding-and-the-sec.html [hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding Blog].
10. Issa Letter, supra note 9.
11. The Future of Capital Formation: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight &
Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts05101 Imls.htm
[hereinafter Schapiro Testimony].
12. Id. The email box referenced in Chairman Schapiro's testimony is available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regulatoryreviewcomments.shtml.
13. H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.
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The U.S. Senate then took up the cause. As the House passed its bill,
Senator Scott Brown introduced a Senate crowdfunding bill, the
Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791.14 Hearings were
held on December 1, 2011 . The information in this article remains current
to that date, except as otherwise specified.
The federal government's current focus on crowdfunding and related
capital formation strategies and business models is an important and
necessary step in defining the reach of federal securities law rules in
regulating crowdfunding and other innovative capital-raising methods and
capital markets.16 We assert that, with the right approach, Congress and the
SEC can work with the crowdfunding industry in defining responsible
parameters for crowdfunding. This article is designed to contribute to the
regulatory conversation.
In our view, protecting investors and maintaining market integrity-the
two principal policies underlying the federal securities laws--do not clearly
compel registering interests offered and sold through crowdfunding
websites, even if those interests are securities within the meaning of the
Securities Act.17 This article supports our contention in several ways. First,
it explores both the foundational definitional question-whether
crowdfunding interests are securities, and if so, when-and the implications
of the answer to that definitional question as a matter of positive law and
underlying policy. The article then addresses the advantages and
disadvantages of the crowdfunding venture finance model. Finally we
conclude by proposing the principles, processes, and substantive
php (actual bill text may be accessed by searching for appropriate bill number).
14. S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php
(actual bill text may be accessed by searching for appropriate bill number).
15. See Bill Summary and Status, 112th Congress (2011-2012), S. 1791, availableat
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dll2:s.01791:; see also U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Spurring Job Growth through Capital Formation
while Protecting Investors, available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Hearings.Hearing&HearinglID=a96clbcl-b064-4b01-a8ad- 11e86438c7e5. We note
as we go to press that on December 9, 2011 a second crowdfunding bill, S. 1970, was
introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senator Jeff Merkley of Oregon. See S. 1970, 112th Cong.
(2011), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (actual bill text may be
accessed by searching for the appropriate bill number). This article does not incorporate or
address S. 1970 or any subsequent bill.
16. Another Internet-based market for small business finance that also has attracted
SEC attention is the peer-to-peer lending market. See Angus Loten, Peer-to-PeerLoans
Grow, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2011, at B10.
17. This question is of paramount importance to the SEC as it contemplates the
appropriate level of regulation of crowdfunding. See Issa Letter, supra note 9, at 23. ("In
considering whether an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act is
appropriate for capital formation strategies like crowdfunding, the Commission will be
mindful of its dual responsibilities of facilitating capital formation and protecting
investors.").

2011]

CROWDFUNDING

885

components of a registration exemption designed to enable the
crowdfunding model to survive as an investment vehicle while
appropriately protect those investors who cannot fend for themselves.
To accomplish these objectives, the article proceeds in four additional
parts. Part II analyzes the circumstances under which crowdfunding
interests are securities under the definition provided in Section 2(a)(1) of
the Securities Act.'8 After situating crowdfunding interests as potential
investment contracts governed by the Howey test (or, in the alternative, debt
interests governed by the Reves test),19 this Part of the article explains the
elements of an investment contract and compares and contrasts them, in
pertinent part, to the attributes of crowdfunding interests. This analysis
reveals that some crowdfunding interests are likely classifiable as
securities. 20 Given that some crowdfunding interests may be securities, Part
III of the article then focuses on the consequences of that legal conclusion.
Part III describes the regulatory ramifications of security status under the
Securities Act's key operative provisions (which require, in significant part,
that the offer and sale of a security must be registered or exempt from
registration 2 1) and the policies underlying both the registration requirement
and relevant exemptions. Part IV explains why the offer and sale of
crowdfunding interests under certain conditions should not require
registration, and suggests the principles and potential parameters of a new
registration exemption for crowdfunding interests, which could be adopted
by the SEC under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (although Congress
would be charged with making some related changes to law to facilitate the
overall exemption scheme).22 Part V offers a summary conclusion.
II. ARE CROWDFUNDING INTERESTS SECURITIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT?

Our concern about the application of the Securities Act in the context of
crowdfunding websites is misplaced if crowdfunding interests are not
securities. Accordingly, this Part addresses the threshold question of
whether crowdfunding interests are securities under the Securities Act.
The Securities Act contains a statutory definition of the term "security,"
which states that, "unless the context otherwise requires, the term
'security"' includes a variety of listed financial instruments.23 The list
includes, among other more typical financial interests (such as stock, bonds,
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
19. See infra notes 25-26, 52-55 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part II.B.5.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c-e.
22. See id. § 77c(b). Although we assume in this article that the SEC would initiate
regulation under Section 3(b), a comparative institutional assessment to determine the
appropriate rule maker should be undertaken. See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
23. See id. § 77b(a)(1).
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debentures, evidence of indebtedness, and options), an "investment
contract."24 In cases involving instruments other than standard equity, debt,
and derivative instruments, the application of Section 5's registration
mandate often depends on whether the particular financing device is an
investment contract and, therefore (unless the context otherwise requires), a
25
security. Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a common law
test, known as the Howey test, for determining whether or not a financial
instrument is an investment contract.2 6 Under the Howey test, "an
investment contract for the purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter
or a third party. ... " Howey involved the solicitation of purchasers of real
property interests and related service contracts that together represented
28
profit-sharing interests in Florida citrus groves. The court found that these
combined transactions constituted investment contracts and, given the
context, securities.29
A. Howey Explained and Interpreted
The various parts of the Howey test have been illuminated in
meaningful ways in subsequent federal court opinions, including a number
of Supreme Court opinions. For example, in United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman,30 the Supreme Court better identified when an arrangement
constitutes an "investment." The Forman Court focused on differentiating
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 392-97 (2004) (holding that a sale and
leaseback arrangement of payphones on the promoter's property was an investment
contract); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding
that a program for breeding beavers was an investment contract); Miller v. Cen. Chinchilla
Grp., Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1974) (reversing the lower court's pretrial dismissal
on grounds that evidence presented at trial could possibly show that a program in which
investors raised chinchillas and sold the offspring to the owners at inflated prices constituted
an investment contract).
26. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946) (determining that an
arrangement to sell profit-sharing interests in a citrus grove was an investment contract).
27. Id. at 298-99; see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975) ("The touchstone [of an investment contract] is the presence of an investment in a
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.").
28. The investment interests offered in the Howey case included a land sales contract
for a citrus grove by W. J. Howey Company and an accompanying service contract with W.
J. Howey Company's affiliate, Howey-in-the-Hills Service Inc. The service contract gave
Howey-in-the-Hills a leasehold interest that allowed the company to cultivate the crops on
the land. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295-96.
29. Id. at 300.
30. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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"consumption" and "use" from "investment,"3 and determined that the
latter occurs when "the investor is 'attracted solely by the prospects of a
return on his investment.'" 32 Thus, whether an investment exists depends on
whether profits motivated the potential investor's decision to provide funds.
Because the expectation of profits is an independent component of the
Howey test, 33 we discuss profits separately below.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not defined a "common enterprise," and
federal courts of ap eal have taken different approaches when determining
whether one exists. Depending on the jurisdiction, a business venture may
be a common enterprise under Howey 's progeny if it meets one of three
judicially ordained tests. Two principal types of commonality exist, one of
which has two different forms.
The first type of commonality recognized in these court cases is
horizontal commonality. "A horizontal common enterprise is a pool of
assets . . . not separate accounts . .

.

."35

The horizontal commonality

approach focuses on the relationship among the investors and requires that
there be a pooling of investors' funds for the purpose of generating
financial returns based on the success of the venture and, in some cases, a
sharing of profits and losses on a pro-rata basis among investors.36 For
example, in Howey, the purchasers were offered "an opportunity to
contribute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit
enterprise." The Court noted that purchasers of the land and management
31. Idat852-53.
32. Id. at 852 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 300). Forman and other federal cases
typically do not focus on the word "solely" as a part of this analysis, preferring instead to
look at degrees of significance. See, e.g., Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D.
111. 1977) ("The court must therefore consider the nature of the promotion to determine
whether the emphasis of the developers and their sales agents was on the 'investment' or the
'consumption' side of the real estate duality."). The issue in Forman was whether a
mandatory acquisition of stock by tenants who wished to lease an apartment in a cooperative
housing project involved the purchase of securities. Forman, 421 U.S. at 840. The Court
concluded that because the tenants "purchase[d] a commodity for personal consumption or
living quarters for personal use," the interests in the co-op were not securities. Id. at 858.
33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
34. Christopher L. Borsani, A "Common" Problem:Examining the Need for Common
Ground in the "Common Enterprise" Element of the Howey Test, 10 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 1, 7
(2008).
35. Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 638 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D. Mass. 1985).
36. Borsani, supra note 34, at 8 (citations omitted). This approach, "as required by the
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits," depends on "whether [investors'] risks were pooled for
a single investment purpose." Id. at 9 (citing Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc. of Florida,
867 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1989)).
37. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. At least one commentator, however, believes that the
investment scheme in Howey is not characterized by a pooling of investor funds. See James
D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprisein Investment Contracts, 72 OHIo ST. L.J. 59,
73 (2011) ("[H]orizontal commonality was not present in Howey itself because each investor
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contracts had "no right of entry to market the crop; thus there [was]
ordinarily no right to specific fruit. The company [was] accountable only
for an allocation of the net profits based upon a check made at the time of
picking."3 8
Vertical commonality, the other principal type of commonality for
purposes of Howey's investment contract definition, focuses on the
relationship between the promoter and the investors, eliminating the
requirement that investors pool their funds.39 The Ninth Circuit has stated
that "[a] common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those
seeking the investment or of third parties."40 Thus, strict vertical
commonality (as the Ninth Circuit standard has been labeled) describes a
venture in which the principals or promoters do not make a profit until the
investors make a profit. In other words, strict vertical commonality re uires
a link between investment performance and promoter remuneration.4 The
promoter must have a financial stake in the investment, and the "fortunes of
the investor [are] commingled with, and dependent upon the success of the
promoter. A2
Other courts have rejected this narrow definition of a common
enterprise in favor of a more open inquiry. The resultant broad vertical
commonality test merely recognizes the existence of a relationship between
the promoter's efforts and the investor's profits. "[T]he requisite
commonality is evidenced by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are
inextricably tied to the efficacy of the [promoter's efforts].'"3 Accordingly,
broad vertical commonality requires a relationship between investor and
promoter, but does not require that the promoter actually benefit in a
manner consistent with the benefit promised to the investors (i.e., the
promoter's remuneration need not be dependent upon the success of the
individually owned a separate tract of land."). We disagree. Although each investor
purchased separate real estate, the profit-generating scheme to which each investor was
contributing in that purchase involved the aggregation of their funds and lands, maintained
and harvested collectively, with profits doled out from the aggregate enterprise based on the
number of tracts owned. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295-96. In this regard, the purchaser's interests
in the separate tracts of land (represented by deeds and service contracts) were the equivalent
of a stock certificate in corporate equity investments-a tangible representation of each
investor's profit-sharing interest. Id. at 300 ("Their respective shares in this enterprise are
evidenced by land sales contracts and warranty deeds, which serve as a convenient method
of determining the investors' allocable shares of the profits. The resulting transfer of rights
in land is purely incidental.").
38. Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.
39. Borsani, supranote 34, at 9.
40. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
41. Borsani, supranote 34, at 9-10.
42. Id. "[T]he Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that follows this approach." Id at 10.
43. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
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venture, but the investor's profits must be dependent upon the promoter's
expertise and labor)." Although the circuits differ on the exact scope of the
"common enterprise" requirement, horizontal commonality (which often,
but not always, exists regardless of the nature of any vertical commonality
in a potential investment contract arrangement) is sufficient to satisfy this
prong of the Howey test in most federal courts.
Finally, federal courts have illuminated the last two parts of the Howey
test-the parts relating to expectations of profits from the efforts of others.
The FormanCourt defined "profits" as "either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment . .., or a participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds . ...
In a subsequent
case, the Court announced that fixed returns may constitute profits under
the Howey test.
With respect to the "solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third
party" prong in Howey (commonly shortened to "solely from the efforts of
others"48), federal circuit court decisions have established that the proper
analysis is not whether the efforts of others are the exclusive determinants
of the investors' profits, but rather "whether the efforts made by those other
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."4 9
Although the Court has not directly endorsed this relaxed interpretation, it
"appears to have acquiesced in [this] formulation."50 As a result, the
definition of broad vertical commonality is effectively synonymous with
the "efforts of others" test, conflating two of the Howey test prongs-the
existence of a common enterprise and the generation of profits from the
44. Borsani, supra note 34, at 10 (citing SEC v. Cont'1 Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d
516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974)).
45. Id. at 12.
46. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
47. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004) ("There is no reason to distinguish
between promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns for the purposes of the
test, so understood.").
48. Howey itself used this terminology. SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)
("The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.").
49. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973); see also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir.
1974) ("[A] close reading of the language employed in Howey and the authority upon which
the Court relied suggests that . . . we need not feel compelled to follow the 'solely from the
efforts of others' test literally.").
50. MARC 1. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAWS 19 (5th ed. 2009). As
dictum, the Forman Court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Glenn W
Turner Enterprises case, 474 F.2d at 482, which "held that 'the word 'solely' should not be
read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract."' Forman,
421 U.S. at 852 n. 16. Because this issue was not presented in Forman, the Court expressed
no view on this matter in its holding. Id.
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B. Howey Applied in Context
Although the attributes of crowdfunding ventures differ within a range
(as illustrated in Table 1), the interests that some crowdfunding websites
and crowdfunded ventures offer are equity interests that afford the owners
some revenue or profit-sharing rights. Our analysis in this article, and our
application of the Howey test, both concentrate on these equity-type
interests.
However, before applying Howey to crowdfunding interests, we note
that some crowdfunding interests are styled as debt instruments. This type
of instrument (separately listed under the "security" definition in Section 2
of the Securities Act as a "note, . . . bond, debenture, [or] evidence of

indebtedness" 5 2) likely would be analyzed under the "family resemblance"
test established in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 5 3 rather than the Howey test.
The Reves test begins with a "presumption that every note is a security." 54
The presumption may be rebutted by reference to a Second Circuit "list of
instruments commonly denominated 'notes' that nonetheless fall without
the 'security' category."" If, however, the instrument is not among those
listed,
[m]ore guidance . . . is needed. . . . [A]s the Second Circuit itself has
noted, its list is "not graven in stone," and is therefore capable of
expansion. Thus, some standards must be developed for determining when
an item should be added to the list.
An examination of the list itself makes clear what those standards
should be. In creating its list, the Second Circuit was applying the same
factors that this Court has held apply in deciding whether a transaction
involves a "security." First, we examine the transaction to assess the
51.

See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting broad

commonality, and noting that under the concept, "two separate questions posed by Howey-whether a common enterprise exists and whether the investors' profits are to be derived

solely from the efforts of others-are effectively merged into a single inquiry"); Gordon,
supra note 37, at 76 ("Broad vertical commonality is present whenever the first, third, and
fourth prongs of the Howey test are met-i.e., when there is an investment of money with an
expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others. Thus, the broad vertical commonality
test eliminates the common enterprise prong of the Howey test.").
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
53. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (establishing the family
resemblance test in analyzing when "notes," as debt instruments listed in both the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act, are securities).
54. Reves, 494 U.S. 56 at 65 (footnote omitted).
55. Id.
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motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into
it. If the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business
enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested
primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is
likely to be a "security." If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase
and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller's
cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other commercial or consumer
purpose, on the other hand, the note is less sensibly described as a
"security." Second, we examine the "plan of distribution" of the
instrument to determine whether it is an instrument in which there is
"common trading for speculation or investment." Third, we examine the
reasonable expectations of the investing public: The Court will consider
instruments to be "securities" on the basis of such public expectations,
even where an economic analysis of the circumstances of the particular
transaction might suggest that the instruments are not "securities" as used
in that transaction. Finally, we examine whether some factor such as the
existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of
the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts
unnecessary. 56
Crowdfunding interests structured in the form of interest-bearing notes
or similar debt instruments are likely to be classified as securities under the
Reves test. Although crowdfunding interests do not typically trade in a
secondary market, and the Howey test does not require an assessment of the
applicability of alternative risk-reduction regulatory schemes, the same
essential issues and tensions exist in the application of both the Howey and
Reves tests.
Given their context, crowdfunding interests styled as equity instruments
with profit-sharing components are best seen not only as investment
contracts but also as securities under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act58
as interpreted by Howey and its progeny. Our analysis breaks the Howey
test into five parts or prongs.59 We add to that analysis a brief discussion of
56. Id. at 65-67 (citations omitted).
57. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 21-25 (engaging in an analysis of whether
crowdfunding interests styled as debt instruments are securities and concluding that
"crowdfunding notes that promise to pay interest to investors would probably be securities
under the Reves test.").
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
59. The more standard framework for analysis separates the investment contract
definition into three or four elements. See, e.g., Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th
Cir. 2009) (applying Howey in three parts but acknowledging that others use a four-part
test); United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1116 (5th Cir. 1980) (referring to
"application of the four-pronged Howey-Forman test"); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[The Howey test] subsumes within it three elements:
first, that there is an investment of money; second, that the scheme in which an investment is
made functions as a common enterprise; and third, that under the scheme, profits are derived
solely from the efforts of individuals other than the investors.").
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context. To illustrate our analysis, we use one of the crowdfunding websites
featured in Table 1, 33needs, as our primary example. 60 Except as otherwise
noted in the analysis set forth below, we assume that U.S. law applies to the
purchase of the subject crowdfunding interests.
1. Contract, Transaction, or Scheme
Beginning with the first prong of the Howey test, the language,
"contract, transaction or scheme" is seemingly broad enough to cover all
crowdfunding business operations. However, we have found no court
decision defining these terms in this context. Jurists and legal scholars
easily pass over this component of the Howey test and consider it satisfied
because of its ostensible breadth.62 In relevant part, the Howey Court notes
that the overall investment contract definition it propounds originates from
earlier state law opinions, 63 and that it is "immaterial whether the shares in
60. See 33NEEDS, http://www.33needs.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). We chose this
site as our example because it allows for a more detailed treatment of the "investment of
money" part of the Howey test. In the interest of full disclosure, it must be noted here that
one of us (Professor Heminway) has been in communication with the founder of
33needs.com since January 2010. We note that, at the time final edits were made to this
article, the 33needs website had been taken down in anticipation of a site redesign and
redevelopment "to take advantage of the likely legislative changes re equity ownership."
Email message from Josh Tetrick to Joan Heminway, Nov. 22, 2011 12.58 PM (on file with
the Tennessee Law Review). The 33needs example (which was included in prior versions of
the article made available on the Social Science Research Network, http://www.ssrn.com)
remains a salient one, however, and we have chosen to retain it here.
61. Having assumed this, we note that the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. securities
laws in this context is an unclear matter. Rule 901 of Regulation S under the Securities Act
provides that "[f|or the purposes only of section 5 of the Act, the terms offer, offer to sell,
sell, sale, and offer to buy shall be deemed to include offers and sales that occur within the
United States and shall be deemed not to include offers and sales that occur outside the
United States." 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2011) (citation omitted). Under Regulation S, an offer
or sale occurs outside the United States when it is made in an "offshore transaction," which
requires (among other things) that the offer not be made to a person in the United States and
that any sale transaction meet other specified requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (2011).
This may not be as simple as it sounds. Moreover, despite a recent U.S. Supreme Court
case, Morrison v. Nat'lAustraliaBank, Ltd. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), attempting to clarify the
extraterritorial reach of the key antifraud provision applicable to purchases and sales of
securities, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
78j(b) (2006), questions also remain as to the application of the Morrison rule in specific
cases.
62. See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1081, 1131 (1988) ("Over time, courts have refined the
Howey test into three elements: (1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise with
(3) an expectation of profits that will be derived from others' efforts.").
63. SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). These opinions provide important
background and context, but offer little in the way of content not embodied in the Howey
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the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in
the physical assets employed in the enterprise."64 Moreover, as the Howey
case illustrates, a unitary legal contract is not required.65 None of these
offers definitive guidance on the meaning of Howey 's first prong.
The words "transaction" and "scheme" do not have an accepted legal
meaning. In common American English usage, the word "transaction"
means "something transacted; especially: an exchange or transfer of goods,
services, or funds;"66 the word "scheme," in this context, means "a plan or
program of action; especially: a crafty or secret one."6 These terms have
expansive meanings, and the Court tacitly embraced them in the Howey
opinion in the description of its overall "investment contract" definition:
It permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and
fair disclosure relative to the issuance of "the many types of instruments
that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a
security." It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits.68
While some crowdfunding business models may not involve the
execution of a formal written contract, the sale of an interest in the funded
venture typically does involve an offer, an acceptance, mutual obligation,
the transfer of consideration and other elements of a legally valid, binding,
and enforceable contract under U.S. law.69 For example, 33needs describes
opinion.
64. id. at 299.
65. Id. at 300 (noting that the plaintiffs' "respective shares in this enterprise are
evidenced by land sales contracts and warranty deeds."); see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S.
389, 391 (2004) (involving the sale of payphones "packaged with a site lease, a 5-year
leaseback and management agreement, and a buyback agreement"); Hocking v. Dubois, 885
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving the purchase of a condominium packaged with several
rental agreements).
66. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1327 (11th ed. 2003). Similarly,
Black's Law Dictionarydefines a "transaction" as: "(1) The act or an instance of conducting
business or other dealings; .

. .

. (2) Something performed or carried out; a business

agreement or exchange. (3) Any activity involving two or more persons." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1635 (9th ed. 2009).
67. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1110 (11th ed. 2003). Black's
Law Dictionary defines a "scheme" as: "(1) A systematic plan; a connected or orderly
arrangement, esp. of related concepts." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 66, at 1462.
68. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (citation omitted).
69. The five primary requirements of a valid contract are:
one or more promisors and one or more promisees having legal capacity to enter
into the contract; at least one promisor or one promisee who is an individual party
on but one side of the contract, as distinguished from membership in an entity
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the investment7 0 process in the frequently asked questions (FAQ) part of its
website:
How do I invest?
So simple: just click the big invest button on any company page. You'll be
asked to select your investment amount. From there, you will go through
Amazon.com's secure and uber simple checkout process.
Accordingly, the investment is made in the form of a standard ecommerce purchase and sale accomplished by either paying funds from a
checking account or using a debit or credit card. Under U.S. law, Internet
purchases generally are acknowledged to be valid, binding, and enforceable
contracts if made by persons having legal capacity. 72 Interestingly, the
33needs website expressly raises questions about both extraterritoriality and
the legal capacity of investors:73
Can I invest if I'm not in the US?
Absolutely. You can invest (or list your company) if you live on a remote
island off the coast of Kenya or live in the heart of New York City.

which may be a party on the other side; a manifestation of mutual assent by the
parties who form the contract, to the terms of the contract and by each promisor to
the consideration for a promise, with limited exceptions; sufficient consideration,
again with limited exceptions; and a requirement that the transaction must not be
one declared void by statute or by special rules of the common law.
1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:2, at 270-72 (4th ed. 2007) (footnotes
omitted); see also 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 19 (2004) ("The elements of a valid
contract have been stated as . . . an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration, a
manifestation of mutual assent, and legality of the object and of the consideration.").
70. The use of the word "investment" is not meant to convey a legal conclusion for
purposes of the Howey test or otherwise. Rather, it is the term used for purchases of
interests on the 33needs website. See FAQ, 33NEEDs, http://www.33needs.com/pages/faq
(last visited Sept. 2, 2011) (noting in particular the response to "I'm confused. Why do you
call this an investment?").
71. FAQ, 33NEEDS,supra note 70.
72. See JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, SECURITY, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES IN E-COMMERCE
185 (Artech House 2001). See generally U.C.C. § 2-204(4)(b) (2004) ("A contract may be
formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual acting on the individual's
own behalf or for another person.").
73. Again, "investors" is the word used on the 33needs website and its use is not
intended to convey a legal conclusion. See FAQ, 33NEEDS, supra note 70.
RICHARD A. LORD,
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Do investors need to be a certain age?
Investors who participate can be any age.
Do investors need to be in the U.S.?
Not at all.74
Regardless of whether the purchase of crowdfunding interests
constitutes a valid, binding, and enforceable contract, the purchase by
funders of a crowdfunding interest qualifies as a transaction or scheme-a
plan or program to finance a business or project through the exchange of
funds for profit-sharing interests. Even before Howey, the Court noted that
the inclusion of terms such as "investment contract" in the Securities Act
evidences a legislative intent to bring "novel, uncommon, or irregular
devices" under the coverage of the Securities Act in some circumstances.
While crowdfunding is a fairly distinctive and new phenomenon, it is
difficult to fathom how a financing plan or program that involves the
exchange of funds for profit-sharing interests in a third-party's venture over
the Internet would not qualify as a contract, transaction, or scheme under
the Howey test.
2. Investment of Money
A number of crowdfunding business models involve people spending
money with the prospect of getting more money back, seemingly satisfying
the second prong of the Howey test. As shown in Table 1, many
crowdfunding websites offer funders a financial return on the interests
purchased. When such a return is offered, it is usually in the form of a
74. Id.
75. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943); see also SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) ("By including an investment contract within the
scope of [Section] 2(1) of the Securities Act, Congress was using a term the meaning of
which had been crystallized by . . . prior judicial interpretation," under which state courts
had construed the term broadly "so as to afford the investing public a full measure of
protection.").
76. There are, however, many crowdfunding websites that do not offer traditional
financial returns (in the form of capital appreciation or a participation in earnings) to
funders. For example, Kiva is a microfinancing venture that secures loans for start-up
businesses in lesser-developed countries. See How Kiva Works, KIvA, http://www.kiva.org/
about/how (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). The funders receive repayments of the principal of
their loans with no interest. Id. Additionally, VenCorps provides start-up capital and enables
funders to earn points for their contributions, which can be redeemed for various nonfinancial goods and services. FAQ, VENCORPs, http://www.vencorps.com/Page/FAQ#funder
(last visited Dec. 26, 2011). For example, the VenCorps store might offer an iPad to be
auctioned off to funders who bid points for the product. Id. This type of funding model is
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revenue-sharing or profit-sharing arrangement." Examining this bargain in
isolation, there appears to be a clear income-seeking intent and motive on
the part of funders.
However, dicta in the Howey case, which was subsequently cited and
applied by the Court in Forman, raises a question as to whether all
exchanges of money made in the hopes of getting a return are investments
of money for the purpose of determining the existence of an investment
contract. Specifically, the Howey Court noted that the purchasers of the
land and contracts were "attracted solely by the prospects of a return on
their investment." 7 9 Many crowdfunding websites raise funds to support the
production of goods and services by artists and others, and these
crowdfunded ventures often reward funders with free or discounted
products or services created or sold by the funded business.80 For example,
in May 2011, 33needs featured a business venture, More than Me, Inc., that
"funds the education of girls in Liberia by selling laptop covers, which are
made by local Liberian women."8 ' On the 33needs website, More than Me
promises investors a return of "5% of our revenue for 1 year. . . . If you
invest $100 or more, you'll get one of the first 100 laptop slip covers." 82
33needs also plans to offer other benefits to investors based on the number
of "impact points" investors earn in funding featured businesses. The

less likely to be an investment contract under Howey. We question, however, whether the
regulation of crowdfunding should turn on this difference.
77. We believe that it is inconsequential for purposes of the Howey test whether the
current return on a crowdfunding interest represents a share of revenues or profits. For
example, one way in which the Forman Court referred to profits was as "a participation in
earnings . . . ." United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
Additionally, the Edwards Court found that a fixed rate of return could support investment
contract status under Howey. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004) ("There is no
reason to distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns for
purposes of the test, so understood. In both cases, the investing public is attracted by
representations of investment income .... .").
78. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
79. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
80. For example, SellaBand is a crowdfunding site that supports music artists and
entitles funders to "[r]eceive free downloads and other goodies artists might offer like
exclusive CDs, t-shirts, free lunches etc." How It Works, SELLABAND, https://www.sellaband
.com/en/pages/how itworks (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). Peerbackers is another website
that funds start-up businesses where funders receive various "rewards or perks" at the
entrepreneurs' discretion. FAQ, PEERBACKERS, http://peerbackers.com/faq (last visited Dec.
26, 2011). Because financial rewards are strictly prohibited, the rewards are usually in the
form of products created by the enterprise. Id.
81. More Than Me, 33NEEDS, http://www.33needs.com/ventures/more-than-me (last
visited Sept. 2, 2011).
82. Id.
83. FAQ, 33NEEDS, supra note 70.

2011]

CROWDFUNDING

897

hybrid nature of the benefits offered on some crowdfunding websites blurs
the line between investment and consumption as set forth in Forman.84
The 33needs venture raises additional concerns about the investment of
money under Howey and Forman. 33needs focuses on social enterprise
funding and markets itself as a financing venture for social entrepreneurs:ss
Just so I'm clear, who raises money on 33needs?
Social entrepreneurs. They lead companies solving the world's biggest
needs, also known as social enterprises. You've heard of them, right? If
not, just Google it.8 6
As demonstrated above, 33needs encourages funders to finance the
ventures it features based on more than a classic investment or consumption
interest. It markets and sells altruism (funding a better world) and
meaningfulness (the emotional satisfaction of having an individual impact):
This is just about the money, then?

Not at all. We also believe 33needs powers something as-or even
more-important than money: it powers community. And particularly in
the world of social good, where people feel an emotional attachment to
your company, building a community of passionate supporters (that means
you) can often drive change. And that, after all, is what it's all about.
What's the larger point, though?

Put simply: it's all about maximizing social and environmental impact.
Nothing else matters. Thousands of entrepreneurs need a disruptive
financial innovation: a way to connect with the vast pool of capital in the
hands of our friends, our family, and the growing number of people who
believe business-led solutions allow for a deeper, more sustained impact
than old models. We think impact investing can play a crucial role in
solving our world's biggest needs. That's why we're here.87
This mixed-motivation solicitation likely encourages people to fund
businesses featured on the 33needs website for one or more reasonsfinancial return, preferential access to goods or services, emotional
satisfaction, or contribution to the public good.
The hybrid nature of the motivation of purchasers of crowdfunding
interests is, however, unlikely to change the conclusion that crowdfunding
interests represent an investment of money. In deciding subsequent
84. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Mission, 33NEEDs, http://www.33needs.com/pages/mission (last visited
Sept. 2, 2011).
86. FAQ, 33NEEDS, supra note 70.
87. Id.
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investment contract cases, federal courts generally have given little effect to
the language in Howey referencing investors attracted "solely by the
prospects of a return on their investment."88 For example, in Teague v.
Bakker, a case involving "approximately 160,000 individuals who
purchased 'Lifetime Partnerships' from an entity known as 'PTL' entitling
them to a short stay annually in a hotel at a vacation retreat constructed by
PTL,"" the court did not give dispositive weight to testimony from some
purchasers that their motivation was personal use of the hotel rather than
profit:
It would make little sense for the existence of a "security" to turn solely
on whether those who actually invest do so without regard to profit. Such
a rule would be highly impractical. Would the existence of a "security"
change according to each purchaser? If not, how many, or what percentage
of, purchasers would have to have made their investments with an eye
toward profits in order for there to be "securities"? Finally, how could the
SEC be expected to regulate effectively where the existence of a
"security" turns not on how and to whom an investment opportunity is
offered, but only on those who ultimately undertake such an investment?90
In Teague, the court relied on the promotional materials used to solicit
purchases to find that the Lifetime Partnerships may represent an
investment of money with the expectation of profit.9' Interestingly, the
Howey Court offered a similar analysis in determining that an investment
contract existed:
This conclusion is unaffected by the fact that some purchasers choose not
to accept the full offer of an investment contract by declining to enter into
a service contract with the respondents. The Securities Act prohibits the
offer as well as the sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities. Hence it is
enough that the respondents merely offer the essential ingredients of an
investment contract.92
Crowdfunding websites that offer returns to their funders promote the
revenue-sharing or profit-sharing components of that return. For example,
each of the featured businesses on 33needs has its own page on the 33needs
website that includes an "offer" to the investors.93 This page is where the
return on investment is described. In addition, the FAQ page on the 33needs
website clearly distinguishes the capital investments it seeks from donations

88. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (emphasis added).
89. Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1994).
90. Id. at 988 n.12.
91. Id. at 988-89.
92. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300-01 (footnote omitted).
93. Venture Listing, 33NEEDs, http://www.33needs.com/ventures.
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and loans, noting that financial rewards are a fundamental, unique part of
the bargain in funding one of its ventures: 9 4
We're turning the focus of crowdfunding entirely on companies with a
social mission, and allowing ordinary people to invest, make a social
impact, and earnfinancialrewards.
We're the only platform in the world that enables ordinarypeople - you,
neighbor Joe, Aunt Sally, and even your dog Jake (fine, maybe not Jake) to invest in do-good companies (called social enterprises) and earn

financial rewards. For example: 20,000 people could invest, not donate,
$50 each in More than Me, Inc., one of the companies raising money on
33needs 95
This type of marketing supports a conclusion that the purchase of the
subject crowdfunding interests constitutes an investment of money.
Some cases analyzing investment contracts have focused on whether
the primary, rather than exclusive, purpose of the arrangement is to provide
a return to funders." Accordingly, in the case of crowdfunding websites or
crowdfunded ventures that offer both non-financial benefits and financial
return, the satisfaction of the Howey test may depend upon whether the
primary purpose of the arrangement is affording funders preferential access
to goods or services, offering them emotional satisfaction, presenting them
with an opportunity to coitribute to the public good, or providing them a
financial return. Although there are variations among the financing
arrangements on crowdfunding websites we have reviewed, the potential
financial return on the crowdfunding interests described in Table I as
offering "hybrid returns" may have a significantly higher potential value
than the non-financial interest offered. 97 This value disparity may
94. FAQ, 33NEEDS, supra note 70.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (holding that
involvement in a mandatory pension plan was not an investment contract). The Court stated,
"[l]ooking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling his labor
primarilyto obtain a livelihood, not making an investment." Id. (emphasis added); see also
Aschenbach v. Covenant Living Centers-North, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 (E.D. Wis.
1980) ("[R]esidency contracts, which are not transferrable or assignable, are entered into for
the primary purpose of acquiring low cost living space, with the added feature of low cost
maintenance and health care, and not for 'profit' in the sense intended by the Supreme Court

in Howey and Forman.").
97. For example, SellaBand offers a revenue-sharing arrangement (at the artist's
discretion) as well as music downloads, CDs, and t-shirts signed by or promoting the artist.
How it Works, SELLABAND, supra note 80. However, there is no limit on the amount that an
individual funder may contribute. This creates the potential for huge differences between the
monetary values of the financial and non-financial interests funders may receive. For
example, as a result of a large contribution, a funder on SellaBand could be entitled to a
large percentage of revenue, which would have a much greater value than the non-financial
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encourage funders to purchase crowdfunding interests, rather than, for
example, buy goods or services from a traditional brick-and-mortar or
online retailer, where a consumption interest also is involved or contribute
to a charity that funds a social project, where altruism or the public good is
an objective. In other words, a higher potential value of the financial
rewards promised on a crowdfunding website may support the conclusion
that the site is primarily offering a revenue-sharing or profit-sharing
arrangement. Under these circumstances, it is hard to argue that the
funder's primary purpose in purchasing crowdfunding interests on these
websites is not the investment of money.
Finally, in determining whether a contract, transaction, or scheme
represents an investment of money, some courts focus on whether the
arrangement subjects the funder to a loss. 9 8 Under this analysis, which is
sometimes seen as the equivalent of a risk capital analysis, 99 crowdfunding
interests may represent a form of financing that subjects the funder to the
loss of his or her initial investment. Crowdfunding interest purchasers
typically have little or no control over the success of the business they fund,
and unless funds are conveyed in the form of a debt instrument, have no
right to a return of their capital (although many equity-type crowdfunding
interests (i.e., music downloads, CD, t-shirts, etc.).
98. See, e.g., Becks v. Emery-Richardson, Inc., No. 86-6866, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21066, at *36 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 1990) ("Generally, an 'investment' in this context means
that the investor commits his assets to an enterprise or venture in such a manner as to subject
himself to financial loss.").
99. See, e.g., Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (outlining a
Ninth Circuit risk capital test that was used to determine whether notes are securities prior to
the Court's opinion in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)). In the investment
contract context under our framework, the risk capital test is typically used to assess the
combination of the second, fourth, and fifth prongs of the Howey test. 'First Citizens Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 919 F.2d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 1990).
Given its substantial overlap with key parts of the Howey test, the risk capital test sometimes
is seen as an alternative to the Howey test. See, e.g., Martin v. T. V. Tempo, Inc., 628 F.2d
887, 891 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Plaintiffs urge that the district court erred in failing to analyze the
franchise agreement under the so-called 'risk capital' approach. We previously have taken
note of this alternative to the Howey test . . . ."). In its modem formulation, the "risk capital"
test examines four factors:
The "risk capital" test requires a consideration of the following factors: (1)
whether funds are being raised for a business venture or enterprise; (2) whether the
transaction is offered indiscriminately to the public at large; (3) whether the
investors are substantially powerless to effect the success of the enterprise; and (4)
whether the investors' money is substantially at risk because it is inadequately
secured.
Moreland v. Dep't of Corp., 239 Cal. Rptr. 558, 566 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1987) (decided
under California State law).
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business models provide that capital will be returned if a stated funding
threshold is not met 00).
Based on the promotion of a money-making potential, crowdfunding
interests that offer financial returns to funders likely satisfy the second
prong of our five-pronged Howey test.
3. Common Enterprise
Turning to the "common enterprise" part of the Howey test, we begin
with horizontal commonality, noting that the pooling of funds obtained
from the crowd is seemingly the essence of crowdfunding.'o' Funders
purchase interests in a particular crowdfunded venture featured on a
crowdfunding website, and typically earn financial returns through revenuesharing or profit-sharing, based on the amount of their investment as a
percentage of the business's aggregate funding target. Their ability to
benefit financially arises from the success of the overall venture. The
investor's funds are locked in once the venture reaches its funding target.
33needs calls this aspect of its operations "all or nothing funding":
What if the company doesn't hit its funding target?
It's all or nothing funding. For example, if a company attempts to raise
$20,000 and falls short of their target, then all the investors will get their
money back.
Is that "all for nothing" model fair to these good companies?

We just think it's less risky for everyone. We want you, the investor, to
have confidence that the company has raised enough to completely
follow-through on their commitments.10 2
This basic financing arrangement, common to many of the
crowdfunding websites we have reviewed, satisfies the requirements of
horizontal commonality.
With respect to vertical commonality, only broad vertical commonality
exists in the typical crowdfunding model. Investor success is generally
dependent on the combined efforts of the crowdfunding website and the
crowdfunded venture.10 3 In most cases, a crowdfunding website (one that is
unaffiliated with the crowdfunded ventures it promotes) takes a fee or
100. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. The 33needs website references the
pooling of funds, classifying crowdfunding as "the collective cooperation by people who
network and pool their money together." Mission, 33NEEDs, supra, note 85.
102. FAQ, 33NEEDS, supra note 70.
103. See supra text accompanying note 44.

902

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:879

commission once the featured venture's funding target is achieved and has
no ongoing interest in the success of that venture parallel to that of the
funders.10 4 However, if a crowdfunding website takes a percentage of the
featured business's revenues or profits along the same lines as the funders,
strict vertical commonality may exist.
The 33needs website is silent as to the nature of the compensation or
financial benefit, if any, that it receives for promoting the featured ventures,
but the principal of 33needs confirmed that 33needs takes a 5% fee from
any venture that successfully reaches its funding target.'0 5 The FAQ portion
of the website is clear, however, about the fact that 33needs does not take
an ownership or intellectual property interest in the enterprises it features.'0 6
Accordingly, 33needs exhibits broad vertical commonality only.
Although a case-by-case analysis of individual crowdfunding sites
would yield different results with respect to the existence of broad or strict
vertical commonality, the fact that almost every crowdfunding site that we
examined satisfies the horizontal commonality test, which is sufficient to
establish a common enterprise in many jurisdictions,"0 " leads to the
conclusion that most crowdfunding business models constitute common
enterprises for purposes of the Howey test.
4. Expectation of Profits
In analyzing the second part of the Howey test under our taxonomythe investment of money prong-we necessarily engaged some of the
analysis relevant to this fourth attribute of an investment contract under
Howey, the expectation of profits. An investor of money is one who is
motivated by financial return in making an expenditure of funds. 08 As
noted in our description and analysis in Part II.B.2, the financial benefit that
funders expect (and are led to expect) from ventures promoted through
crowdfunding websites is a participation in the venture's revenues or
profits.' 09

104. For example, IndieGoGo provides funding for various entrepreneurial projects and
causes for which it takes 4% of the funded amount, but retains no on-going interest in the
funded venture. FAQs, INDIEGoGo, www.indiegogo.com/about/faqs (last visited Dec. 26,
2011). Similarly, Kickstarter provides funding for artists' projects and charges 5% of the
funded amount, but the project's success is entirely in the artists' hands. FAQs,
KICKSTARTER, www.kickstarter.com/help/faq (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
105. Email message from Josh Tetrick to Joan Heminway, May 23, 2011 2:08 PM (on
file with the Tennessee Law Review).
106. FAQ, 33NEEDS, supra note 70 ("Does 33needs or investors on 33needs take some
percentage of ownership or intellectual property in the social enterprises? Absolutely not.").
107. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
109. See supra Part II.B.2.
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There are some crowdfunding websites (typically sites offering debttype interests) that offer a fixed return to funders."o Offering this type of
benefit arrangement (in lieu of revenue-sharing or profit-sharing) is
sufficient to satisfy the expectation of profits prong of the Howey test.'
Crowdfunding websites do not typically allow funders to benefit
through capital appreciation, the other type of financial return recognized as
profit under the Forman case.112 Although most sites do not address the
issue, there is no apparent web-based mechanism for transferring
crowdftnding interests to others. The interests, however, constitute
personal property and therefore should be assignable. Moreover, with minor
exception, there is no evidence that a market exists for the transfer or
assignment of all or some rights in crowdfunding interests.!13 However, if a
market were to develop, the expectation of profits from capital appreciation
also would be possible.
Those who purchase crowdfunding interests that promise a current
return or capital appreciation expect profits under Howey.
5. Solely from the Efforts of Others
The "solely from the efforts of others" prong of the Howey testl1 4 also
is met with respect to almost every crowdfunding business. Under many
crowdfunding business models, the funder serves as a passive patron while
the principals of the crowdfunded venture, with some marketing or
logistical support from the crowdfunding website, are responsible for the
venture's success or failure. 5 In a few instances we have observed, the
funder plays a minor role in selecting, promoting, or conducting the
Regardless of the funders' exact level of
crowdfunded venture.'
110. Microplace is a microfinancing operation that allows funders to contribute money
in the form of a loan to entrepreneurs in less-developed countries. How It Works: Overview,
MICROPLACE, https://www.microplace.com/howitworks (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). The
funder is entitled to a return of the funded amount plus interest. Id. Similarly, 40Billion
provides start-up funds for businesses, on an invitation-only basis, and the funder is entitled
to repayment of the principal plus interest. How It Works, 40BILLION,
www.40billion.com/howitworks.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
111. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
113. One site that aims to facilitate a market for crowdfunding shares is Cinema Shares,
which plans to allow for the purchase of fully listed, publicly tradable on NASDAQ. About
Cinema Shares, CINEMA SHARES, www.cinemashares.com/aboutCS.html (last visited Dec.
26, 2011).
114. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946).
115. See Belleflamme et al., supra note 3, at 3 ("The major fraction are passive
investments; i.e., investments with a promise of compensation but no direct involvement in
the decision-making process or provision of time or expertise for the initiative.").
116. For example, funders who choose to participate as "believers" on SellaBand also
can support the artists of their choice in other ways:
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involvement in a crowdfunded venture, the bulk of the efforts contributing
to the venture's success is supplied by the principals of the crowdfunded
venture, with some support (typically administrative and ministerial) from
the crowdfunding website."'
The crowdfunding website's level of engagement in the operations of
the crowdfunded venture varies in different crowdfunding models. 33needs,
for example, pre-screens the businesses that are featured on the site:
To date, 33needs has received over 900 applications from entrepreneurs
around the world. We have a 4-person investment committee that reviews,
interviews, and selects companies. Sometimes we select them
individually, sometimes collectively. We look at the strength of the
business model, integrity of the team, and the nature of the need being
addressed. We tend to focus on urgent needs." 8
In addition, while 33needs states that the funded ventures are
responsible for upholding the commitments ("offers") they make to
investors,"' 9 it also promises that it will "be working closely with them to
make sure all is right."l 20
In any case, funder profits on the crowdfunding websites we reviewed
would result exclusively or primarily from the efforts of the promoters
(including the crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures), not from
the efforts of the funders themselves. Thus, the fifth and last prong of the
Howey test, like the other four, likely is satisfied by most crowdfunded
ventures. As a result, it is probable that a court would find that
crowdfunding interests that include a financial return are investment
contracts.
C. The Question of Context
Under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, an investment contract is a
security "unless the context otherwise requires.' 12 1 Section 2's introductory

On SellaBand you can support your favorite artists by buying a part and helping
them to raise the funds for a new music project (a new album, tour or the
promotion of their music). . . . Join your favorite artists on their way to reach their
funding goal. Promote them, stay in touch with them and help them.
How It Works, SELLABAND.COM, supra note 80.
117. Id.
118. FAQ, 33NEEDS, supra note 70.
119. Id. (noting that the ventures, themselves, are "responsible for making sure [they]
deliver on what they promise").
120.

FAQ, 33NEEDS,supra note 70.

121.

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
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limitation regarding context is seldom used to disqualify an instrument
listed in Section 2(a)(1) from being a security. However:
courts have held that the definition of what constitutes a security need not
be read literally, thereby giving meaning to the introductory language of
the definition, "unless the context otherwise requires." Stressing that the
Acts were aimed at preventing fraud in the securities market, the Supreme
Court has stated that "[b]ecause securities transactions are economic in
character Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the
economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto." This is the examination which must be made "in searching for
the meaning and scope of the word 'security"'"-form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality."1 22
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he test .

.

. is what character

the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of
distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect.. . . [I]t
is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as being what they
were represented to be." For example, court opinions assessing the status
of "notes" under Section 2(a)(1) have used the context limitation to find
that certain notes are not securities for purposes of the Securities Act.124
The determinative factor in these cases is whether the note is a commercial
instrument or an investment instrument. 125 In the same vein, the Supreme
Court elevated substance over terminology in United Housing Foundation
v. Formanl26 when it determined that interests in a housing cooperative
were not securities despite the fact that the interests were labeled as
"stock," one of the instruments listed in the security definition.' 2 7
122. Ayala v. Jamaica Say. Bank, No. CV-80-1802, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17994, at
*9 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 1981) (citations omitted).
123. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943).
124. See Hunssinger v. Rockford Bus. Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[T]his as well as other Circuits have relied upon the prefatory phrase 'unless the context
otherwise requires' to exclude certain notes from the protection of the federal securities
acts."); see also Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1979)
("Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in
different sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and 1934 Acts preface their lists of
general definitions with the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires"').
125. Hunssinger,745 F.2d at 488.
126. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
127. Id. at 851 ("noting that the interests at issue lack what the Court in Tcherepnin
deemed the most common feature of stock: the right to receive 'dividends contingent upon
an apportionment of profits"' and also fail to "possess the other characteristics traditionally
associated with stock: they are not negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated; they
confer no voting rights in proportion to the numbers of shares owned; and they cannot
appreciate in value." (citation omitted)).
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The key to analyzing context hinges on whether the financial
instrument at issue represents a financial investment vehicle. In this regard,
the Supreme Court in Reves stated, "A commitment to an examination of
the economic realities of a transaction does not necessarily entail a case-bycase analysis of every instrument, however. Some instruments are
obviously within the class Congress intended to regulate because they are
by their nature investments."
Because the Howey test, as applied,
includes an evaluation of a contract, transaction, or scheme as an
investment of money, our analysis in Part II.B.2 already establishes the
necessary context. Crowdfunding interests that include revenue-sharing or
profit-sharing benefits appear to be equity-type capital investment vehicles
despite the potential other benefits they may offer (e.g., consumption
interests and altruistic and emotional satisfaction). 29 Although we
recognize that crowdfunding interests are unique and flexible devices, these
attributes do not exempt them from regulation:
[T]he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are

also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely offered
or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their
character in commerce as "investment contracts," or as "any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."" 30

The analysis in this Part II demonstrates that crowdfunding interests
that include a financial return are offered under terms and in courses of
dealing that establish their character in commerce that are investment
contracts and securities under Howey and its progeny.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF OFFERINGS OF CROWDFUNDING
INTERESTS AS SECURITIES

Our analysis in Part II.B indicates that the interests offered to funders
by some crowdfunding websites-those that offer a revenue-sharing or
profit-sharing arrangement-likely satisfy all five elements of the Howey
test and, therefore, are investment contracts. Because the context in which
crowdfunding interests are offered and sold to funders does not otherwise
require a different categorization, ' 3 we assume for the remainder of this
article that these crowdfunding interests are securities within the meaning
of Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act.132 The status of these interests as
securities exposes crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures to the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,62 (1990).
See supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
See supra Part II.C.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
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prospect of regulation-including through the expensive and timeconsuming process of registering offers and sales of securities-under the
Securities Act. This Part describes both the current regulatory framework
and the underlying policy objectives of that landscape as applied to
crowdfunding interests. With that framework and landscape in mind, Part
III concludes by questioning whether crowdfunding interests that are
securities should be subject to the registration requirements of the Securities
Act.
A. Applicable Regulation
A full-blown description of regulation under the U.S federal securities
laws is beyond the scope of this article (and, indeed, is the subject of threecredit-hour-plus courses in Securities Regulation in U.S. law schools).
However, even a brief summary of key applicable provisions of the federal
securities laws (which is what we provide here) illustrates the weight of
regulation they impose-a transaction cost that is impossible for small
businesses to bear.
1. Registration and Related Liability and Costs
Section 5 of the Securities Act regulates the offer and sale of
securities.13 3 In sum, Section 5 prohibits the offer or sale of securities
without registration, unless an applicable exemption is available.134 An
"offer for sale" or "sale" includes "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security . . . .13' These terms are
interpreted very broadly, making it quite easy for an offeror or seller of
securities to inadvertently violate Section 5 by, for example,
communicating with potential investors before filing a registration
statement.'3 6 If interests in crowdfunded ventures are securities, then the
offer and sale of those interests through a crowdfunding website must be
registered with the SEC, absent an applicable exemption. A parallel system
of registration exists under state law.
If securities are offered or sold in violation of Section 5, Section
12(a)(1) provides the securities purchaser with a private cause of action
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
134. Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).
136. See Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud
Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 606 (1997) ("Section 5 sweeps broadly, regulating every
offer and sale of a security."); Joseph F. Morrissey, Rhetoric and Reality: Investor
Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of 2005, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 561, 568
(2007) ("Section 5(c) of the Securities Act specifically made it unlawful for any person to
offer to sell or buy securities before a registration statement had been filed with the SEC."
"Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act defined "offer" as broadly as it could .... .").
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against the seller, allowing for rescission of the sale, or recovery of
rescissory damages if the purchaser no longer owns the securities. 13 7 False
and misleading registration statements are actionable under Section 11 of
the Securities Act,138 false and misleading prospectuses or oral
communications may result in liability under Section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act,'3 9 and fraudulent conduct in connection with the offer and
sale of securities may be enforced (at least by the SEC) under Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act.140 Further, those who offer and sell securities are
exposed to potential liability for securities fraud claims under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange
Act"), 14 ' and Rule 1Ob-5 under the Exchange Act.142
This is a heavy system of regulation. Registration of the offer and sale
of securities under the Securities Act is an expensive and time-consuming
proposition, and the prospect of lengthy, costly enforcement actions by
private plaintiffs (in individual or class actions), the SEC, and the
Department of Justice loom large. As for the federal registration
requirements, an issuer must file a registration statement that includes
operating and financial disclosures about the issuer, information about the
securities being offered and sold, and details about the plan of distribution
of those securities. 143 The costs of an initial SEC registration typically
include underwriting compensation, a registration fee paid to the SEC, legal
and accounting fees and expenses, printing and engraving costs, a Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority filing fee, electronic filing fees when using a
service for filing, stock exchange listing fees (if applicable), Blue Sky filing
fees (if applicable), and transfer agent and registrar fees when the issuer
retains the services of a third party to handle its stock records.'" Although
137. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823
F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1987).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Although the Exchange Act has its own definition of the term
"security," the definitions under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are substantially
similar, and result in only small differences in application. See JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (6th ed. 2009) ("The '33 Act and the
'34 Act have substantially similar definitions of a security."). Furthermore, the regulatory
schemes of the two acts are integrated, with the Securities Act regulating offers and sales of
securities generally and the Exchange Act largely governing trading transactions on and
through securities markets and market professionals. See COX ET AL., supra, at 7 ("Whereas
the Securities Act grapples with the protection of investors in primary distributions of
securities, the Exchange Act's concern is trading markets and their participants.").
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g; COX ETAL., supra note 141, at 143-47.
144. See COX ET AL., supra note 141, at 156 (setting forth in Note 4 various external
and internal costs of going public); Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense:
The SEC's Continuing Failureto Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.
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certain offerings cost somewhat less because of the nature of the issuer or
the offering (and offering costs are significantly higher for large and
complex offerings), an initial public offering for even a small business will
cost the issuer over $100,000 in fees for third-party services alone, and this
figure does not include the value of the time senior management spends
preparing for and marketing the offering.145 Small business issuers may
have lower registration costs than large businesses in some regards, but the
overall relative costs are high:
[O]ne should appreciate that it is relative, not absolute, offering expenses
that are important. To use an extreme example, $500,000 in offering costs
on a $50 million offering will certainly not kill the transaction, while
$500,000 in offering expenses on a $500,000 deal will kill the transaction.
Accounting, legal and other expenses on small deals can easily
exceed $50,000, and such amounts bulk large relative to the total yield
from a small offering. When added to the costs due to the lack of financial
intermediation services, one is able to appreciate the extreme structural
and economic disadvantages that small entrepreneurs encounter when
attempting to access external capital.14 6
Add to these expenses the ongoing costs of being public, which,
depending on the issuer's assets and equity ownership, may be a long-term
L. & Bus. 1, 8-9 (2007) ("Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the offering, the costs of
the registration process are heavily front-loaded. Accounting fees, attorney retainers, SEC
filing fees, broker-dealer expenses, printing and road show costs are all incurred and become
payable prior to the effective date of the registration statement.").
145. One commentator accurately sums up the cost situation:
Registration involves legal fees, accounting fees, printing costs, filing fees, and
other miscellaneous costs, along with a significant discount paid to the
underwriters. The total expense is hundreds of thousands of dollars. These external
costs are in addition to the time consumed by the company's own employees in
preparation for registration.
C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation andSmall Business: Rule 504 and the Casefor an
Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 24 (2001); see also COX ET
AL., supra note 141, at 156 ("The estimated 2007 costs for a significant IPO are $600,000$800,000 in fees to counsel, $400,000-$600,000 for the auditor, underwriter commissions of
typically 7 percent of the offering amount, $150,000-$200,000 in printing costs, plus various
filing fees. . . ."); Marvin E. Rooks, It Is Time for the FederalTrade Commission to Require
FinancialPerformance Representations to Prospective Franchisees, 11 WAKE FOREST J.
Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 55, 66 (2010) ("The SEC's initial public offering ... process for
even a small company (less than $20 million in revenue) takes six to nine months and costs
at least $100,000 in fees for legal, accounting, audit, printing, filing fees, and underwriter
commissions." (footnote omitted)).
146. Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search For "A
Moderate Capital," 31 DEL. J.CORP. L. 77, 90 (2006).
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proposition, 14 7 and a small business issuer will typically find that the costs
of a registered public offering (even without taking into account the
prospect of private and public enforcement actions) outweigh the
benefits. 14 8 Registration typically takes several months (at a minimum)
because of the length and complexity of the registration statement, the
regulatory filing and review process, and the marketing and sales
activities.149 As a result, issuers may miss important financing opportunities
because favorable market conditions for an offering (so-called "market
windows") will pass unutilized if the offering's registration statement has
not yet been declared effective. Missing a market window can be especially
devastating to small business issuers who can illafford to lose the sunk costs
expendedin initiating and completing the registration process.
The costliness and protracted nature of the registration process are
unfortunate because the registration process has a number of advantages for
small businesses (as well as other issuers):
If registration were an economically viable alternative for small issuers, it
would produce a number of attractive benefits. It would ameliorate
problems of inadvertent loss of an exemption through the impact of the
integration doctrine or failure to meet the technical requirements of a
particular exemption. It would eliminate all resale restrictions that often
adversely impact the attractiveness of exemptions. Finally, it would
provide some help and comfort regarding antifraud compliance.
Scheduled disclosure requirements in registration forms provide a
prepackaged checklist regarding matters and events that may be material
and thus subject to disclosure obligation under antifraud rules, such as
Rule 1Ob-5. Compliance with the registration form, therefore, effectively

147.

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 9 ("Once public, the company is now subject

to the periodic reporting obligations of the ... Exchange Act . .. for at least the remainder of
the first year. . . . These reporting and regulatory burdens weigh extraordinarily heavily on
public-traded small businesses, prompting both administrative and legislative efforts to
modify such requirements for small business issuers." (footnote omitted)); see COX ET AL.,
supra note 141, at 156 ("The publicly traded company incurs the burden of complying with
the periodic reporting requirements of the '34 Act. While out-of-pocket costs may be trivial
in relation to the registrant's assets or income, the more significant costs are those associated
with the consciousness of operating in the public eye.").
148. See Campbell, supra note 146, at 91-92 ("Registration has never been a viable
way for small businesses to raise capital. High transaction costs associated with registered
offerings inevitably put registration out of the range of small businesses in search of capital.
Thus, the data show that small offerings are very rarely made through SEC registration."
(footnotes omitted)); Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 10 ("The combined effect of the
costs imposed by the registration process and the post-registration reporting system is
generally more than sufficient to convince small businesses that financing through a
registered public offering is a most undesirable course.").
149. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 27-28.
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reduces the risk of a material omission of fact that would generate liability
under federal antifraud rules. 150
Furthermore, with the SEC's recent approval of the NASDAQ OMX
BX proposal to establish a new listings market, the "BX Venture
Market,"' 5' registration may afford some small business issuers the
prospects of accessing a formal public trading market. This market is
currently anticipated to launch in 2012.152 Listed companies will be
required to comply with state, as well as federal, securities laws relating to
the offer and sale of securities. 53
2. Exemptions from Registration
Despite its regulatory and potential practical advantages, registration is
a nonstarter for most crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures
because of the expense and prolonged nature of the process. For
crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures, as with many other
small businesses, the amount of money and time required to register a
securities offering will most often prohibit the offering from occurring. 54
Therefore, under the current regime, the only practical means by which
150. Campbell, supra note 146, at 92 n.55 (citations omitted); see also Stuart R. Cohn,
The Impact OfSecurities Laws On Developing Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have
Gotten Off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 315, 361 (1999) ("The SEC finds
two principal benefits from registration-disclosure and the ability to resell securities.").
But see Bradford, supra note 145, at 28-29 (describing inconclusive benefits of registration).
151. Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc.; Order Granting
Approval of Proposed Rule Change, Securities Exchanged Act Release No. 34-64437 (May
6, 2011), availableat http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/bx/2011/34-64437.pdf.
152. See FAQ: When will the BX Venture Market launch?, BX VENTURE MARKET,
http://www.bxventure.com/faq (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
153. See FAQ: How does the BX Venture Market compare to the NASDAQ Stock
Market?, BX VENTURE MARKET, httpV/www.bxventure.com/faq (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
154. See generally Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 10-15 (discussing how the
current regulatory regime fails to adequately provide opportunities for small businesses);
Schapiro Testimony, supra note 11, at I ("Cost-effective access to capital for companies of
all sizes plays a critical role in our national economy, and companies seeking access to
capital should not be overburdened by unnecessary or superfluous regulations."). We note,
however, that at least one crowdfunded business has pursued the registration of a
crowdfunded offering. See Audience Prod., Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Form S-I Registration
Statement (Form S-i/A) (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1474227/000147422710000015/dsla.htm. Ultimately, despite extensions of the
originally established offering period, this offering was unsuccessful. In a post-effective
amendment filed in August 2011, Audience Productions requested deregistration of the
shares offered. See Audience Prod., Inc., Post-Effective Amendment No. 6 to Form S-I
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Aug. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1474227/000147422711000018/dposam.htm.
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crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures can offer or sell
securities is to find an applicable exemption for the security or offering.
Securities may be exempt under Section 3(a) of the Securities Act."'
For example, Section 3(a) of the Securities Act exempts securities issued by
states and municipalities, charitable organizations, and savings and loan
associations.' 6 Section 3(a) does not currently provide an exemption for
crowdfunding interests.
The few possible transactional registration exemptions under the
Securities Act that one would consider in connection with a primary
offering of interests in a crowdfunded business include: the private offering
exemption under Section 4(2);'15 Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation
D;'5 8 and Regulation A.159 However, none of these exemptions provides a
feasible path for a crowdfunding website or crowdfunded venture to avoid
registerin the offer or sale of profit-sharing interests in the crowdfunded
venture. Part III.A.2 outlines the key attributes of each of these possible
exemptions and comments on the unsuitability of each for primary offerings
of crowdfunding interests.
a. Private Offering Exemption under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts from registration
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."l61
Interestingly, the term "public offering" is not defined in the Securities Act
or in SEC rules under the statute.16 2 However, it is generally acknowledged
that the exemption "was designed to apply to specific or isolated sales as
well as offerings to a very small number of securities holders so that the
public interest is not involved."'
155. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2006).
156. Id. § 77c(a)(2), (4), (5).
157. Id. § 77d(2).
158. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2011) (authorized under Sections 3(b) and 4(2) of the
Securities Act).
159. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (authorized under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act).
160. While the intrastate offering exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1), may be applicable
in some situations involving crowdfunding, most crowdfunded ventures seek to raise capital
from investors residing in various states. Because of its unlikely applicability in this context,
we do not further analyze the possible application of the intrastate offering exemption in the
crowdfunding context.
161. 15 U.S.C. at § 77d(2).
162. See Stephen D. Bohrer, The Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Overseas
Business Transactions, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 126, 153 (2005) ("The term 'public
offering' is not defined under the Securities Act."); Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban
on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J. 67, 71 (1989) ("The term 'public offering' is not
defined by statute . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
163. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.24 (5th ed. 2005).
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Soon after the Securities Act was signed into law, the SEC's General
Counsel set forth five attributes of offerings that provide guidance on
whether the offer or sale of securities is a transaction not involving a public
offering under Section 4(2): the number of offerees, the relationship of
offerees to each other and to the issuer, the number of units offered, the size
of the offering, and the manner of the offering.'" The overall message was
that a securities offering is more likely to be characterized as a public
offering if:
*
*
*
*
*

the securities are offered to the many (rather than the few),
the securities are offered to those with no or little preexisting
association to each other or the issuer,
a large number of shares or other investment units (especially if
in smaller denominations) is offered,
the offering is large in aggregate size, and
the offering is conducted through a broad-based advertising
campaign.

This guidance gave transaction-planners and litigators some foundation
for assessing whether particular offerings required registration or were
exempt. Decisional law began to develop under Section 4(2), but eighteen
years passed before the Supreme Court took on the issue of clarifying the
nature of a public offering.
In 1953, the Court decided SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the seminal case
involving the availability of the private offering exemption.'6 6 In Ralston
Purina,the Court refused to impose a numerical limitation as a litmus test
for determining whether a public offering has been conducted.'6" The
Court's opinion indicates that the number of offerees is relevant, but not
dispositive, to this determination. 16 8 Instead, the Court found that "the
exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees."169 According
to the Court, "the applicability of § [4(2)] should turn on whether the

164. General Counsel Letter Regarding Section 4(1), Exchange Act Release No. 285,
111 Fed. Reg. 10952-53 (Jan. 24, 1935) [hereinafter SEC General Counsel Letter].
165. Id.
166. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (8th Cir. 1953).
167. Id. at 125. In this case, Ralston Purina claimed that an offering of treasury stock to
its "key employees" was not a public offering. The group of offerees, however, included any
employee who wanted to participate in the offering. Id. at 121. Although the Court
recognized that some offerings to employees may constitute non-public offerings, the Court
determined that, absent special circumstances such as an offering to certain corporate
executives, "employees are just as much members of the investing 'public' as any of their
neighbors in the community." Id. at 125-26.
168. Id. at 125 ("It may well be that offerings to a substantial number of persons would
rarely be exempt.").
169. Id. at 126.
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particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act."l 70 The
Court determined that where the offerees "are shown to be able to fend for
themselves," they do not need the protection of the Securities Act's
registration requirement, and therefore, the offering should not be
characterized as a public offering for purposes of Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act.17 '
Ralston Purina and its progeny have established two overarching
factors that indicate whether offerees are able to fend for themselves. The
first factor is the "sophistication" of the solicited investors. Offerees who
possess financial and business knowledge that allows them to appreciate the
risks of the investment have been considered sophisticated for these
purposes.172 Sophisticated investors can fend for themselves if they have the
appropriate type and amount of information or access to it. Accordingly, the
second factor is the information or access to information provided to
offerees. Sophisticated offerees provided with substantially the same
information-or meaningful access to substantially the same informationas that provided in a registration statement can fend for themselves. 7 1
Decisional law after Ralston Purina clarifies that access to information
is meaningful when an offeree is able to obtain the information needed to
170. Id. at 125.
171. Id.
172. See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 646 (9th Cir. 1980) (in which the only
evidence of investor sophistication offered was that 60% of the investors were represented
by purchaser representatives, suggesting that "at least . ..the majority of the purchasers, if
not the majority of offerees, lacked the sort of business acumen necessary to qualify as
sophisticated investors"); Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690
(4th Cir. 1971) (recognizing that the sophistication requirement was met where the offering
was made "only to sophisticated businessmen and lawyers . . . ."); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440
F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The Supreme Court in its description of a possible 'private'
group in Ralston Purina includes only persons of exceptional business experience . . . ."). As
these and other cases illustrate, the concept of sophistication is a bit fluid. See C. Howard
Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws 1988 DUKE L.J.
1081, 1084-85 (1988) ("[T]he federal courts' treatment of investor sophistication reflects a
doctrine in disarray . . . [as] the courts' treatment of sophisticated investors shows little
coherence or, if you will, reflects little cross-fertilization among the different settings in
which the sophistication issue arises.").
173. The Ralston Purina Court only references access to information. SEC v. Ralston
Purina, Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (8th Cir. 1953). Subsequent cases in lower courts further
developed this aspect of the doctrine. See Hill York, 448 F.2d at 690 ("[T]he relationship
between the promoters and the purchasers and the 'access to the kind of information which
registration would disclose' become highly relevant factors." (citation omitted)). The
offerees in Hill York had no previous relationship with the issuer at the time of the offering
and were given only a few brochures with minimal information about the issuer. Id. The
court concluded that the offerees "could not bring their sophisticated knowledge of business
affairs to bear in deciding whether or not to invest" in the venture because they did not
possess the "information requisite for a registration statement." Id.
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make an informed investment decision. If an offeree is not actually
provided information akin to that provided in a registration statement, the
offeree must have access to that level of information and a relationship with
the issuer that reasonably enables the offeree to take advantage of the
access to ascertain the information. 174 Therefore, if the issuer does not
disclose the requisite information to the offerees, the issuer must prove that
its relationship with each offeree was such that it satisfied the access
requirement.' The private offering exemption is not available unless both
sophistication and disclosure of or meaningful access to information exists
because "[s]ophistication is not a substitute for access to the information
that registration would disclose." 7 6 Furthermore, disclosure of or access to
important information is an empty promise without the ability to ascertain
and appreciate the risks involved with the investment. 177
By moving away from numerical limitations and focusing on the
concepts of sophistication and disclosure of or meaningful access to a
prescribed level of information, the opinions in Ralston Purina and its
progeny have created "doubts and ambiguities .
,,178Toca

.

. by varying Section 4(2)

interpretations.
To clarify some of the uncertainty surrounding the
application of the Section 4(2) exemption, the SEC adopted Rule 506 as
part of Regulation D under the Securities Act, a safe harbor under Section
4(2).179 We address the rule below. Considering only Section 4(2) and
relevant decisional law, however, the twin concepts of sophistication and
information would require crowdfunded ventures to ensure that all
individuals who visit crowdfunding websites (who would then be offerees)
174. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977). In Doran, the
issuer tried to use the private placement exemption to prevent an investor from rescinding an
agreement for an oil-drilling venture. Id. at 897. The court found that the investor, who had a
degree in petroleum engineering and a net worth of over $1,000,000 (including holdings in
26 oil and gas platforms worth over $850,000), was sophisticated. Id. at 902. The court
concluded, however, that a sophisticated investor could not have used his knowledge of
business affairs to make a prudent investment decision without the information that would
be contained in a registration statement. Id. Focusing on the information requirement, the
court pointed out that where disclosure is shown, "the absence of a privileged relationship
between the offeree and issuer would not preclude a finding that the offering was private."
Id. at 904. However, when an issuer claims the offeree had access to information, "the
relationship between offeree and issuer now becomes critical, for it must be shown that the
offeree could realistically have been expected to take advantage of his access to ascertain the
relevant information." Id. at 904-05.
175. Id. at 904 ("Such access might be afforded merely by the position of the offeree or
by the issuer's promise to open appropriate files and records to the offeree as well as to
answer inquiries regarding material information.").
176. Id. at 892 (citing United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678
(4th Cir. 1967)).
177. Id. at 904-05.
178. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 22.
179. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
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meet the sophistication requirements and are given access to the required
information. This is impractical because (even assuming that sophistication
can be sufficiently ascertained through the Internet) the costs associated
with providing the appropriate level of information to offerees over the
Internet (none of whom may be assumed to have a pre-existing relationship
with the issuer) are high in relation to the benefit sought, which in most
cases is a relatively small amount of funding. Further, "the SEC has
indicated that any 'public advertising is inconsistent with a claim of private
offering."' 180 This prohibition eliminates any hope for an open-access
crowdfunding business model under the private offering exemption.'
b. Rules 504, 505, and 506 ofRegulation D
Regulation D is a set of rules adopted by the SEC to provide
exemptions principally for small issues and small issuers. The main
operative provisions are Rules 504 and 505,83 adopted under the SEC's
exemptive authority in Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 184 and Rule
506,1's adopted under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act. 186 Each exemptive
rule has unique attributes, but there is some overlap in the requirements.
Common to all three rules, however, are three unifying principles. First,
offerings made within six months of each other may be integrated and
considered to be a single offering if they have certain specified common
characteristics.'8 1 Second, securities acquired in Regulation D offerings are
considered restricted securities for purposes of the Securities Act and
cannot be resold absent registration or the availability of an applicable
exemption.'88 Third, except in limited circumstances under Rule 504,
issuers and their agents may not offer or sell securities under Regulation D
using "any form of general solicitation or general advertising."1 89
180. HAZEN, supra note 163, § 4.24 (footnote omitted).
181. See infra Part III.A.2.b. (discussing the prohibition of general advertising).
182. HAZEN, supra note 163, § 4.19[1].
183. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-05 (2011).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2006). Section 3(b) allows the SEC to pass rules and
regulations exempting "any class of securities ... if it finds that the enforcement of [the
Securities Act] is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by
reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering." Id. The
maximum aggregate amount of any offering exempted under Section 3(b) is $5,000,000. Id.
185. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). Section 4(5) (formerly Section 4(6)) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77d(5), which allows for limited offerings to accredited investors, is also a
foundation for the exemptions in Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D. See HAZEN, supra
note 163, § 4.19.
187. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (commonly referred to as "integration").
188. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
189. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).

2011]

CROWDFUNDING

917

Rule 504 provides an exemption for certain offerings not exceeding an
aggregate of $1,000,000 within a twelve-month period.' 90 This exemption
places no limits on the number of offerees or purchasers, and does not
require the issuer to provide specific affirmative disclosure.191
Rule 505 provides an exemption for offerings with a maximum
aggregate offering price of $5,000,000 within a twelve-month period.' 92
The rule limits the number of purchasers to thirty-five, not including
"accredited investors," a term that generally refers to entities and
individuals who are presumed to be able to bear the financial risk of the
total loss of their investment (e.g., institutional investors and high-net-worth
individuals).193 Additionally, Rule 505 requires disclosure of specific
financial and non-financial information to any securities purchasers who are
not accredited investors.194
Rule 506 is a Section 4(2) safe harbor included in Regulation D.' 95
Because it is not based on the SEC's authority to grant exemptions under
Section 3(b), Rule 506 does not limit the maximum aggregate size of an

190. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (commonly referred to as "aggregation").
191. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (apart from the exclusion of public companies,
investment companies, and specified development stage companies, the only conditions that
must be satisfied under this rule--other than the applicable conditions under Rule 502relate to the $1,000,000 aggregate limitation on offering size).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i). Like Rule 504, Rule 505 is not available for
offerings by investment companies. Id. § 230.505(a).
193. 17 C.F.R. at § 230.505(b)(2)(ii). See Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a), (e)
(excluding accredited investors in calculating the number of purchasers for purposes of Rule
505 and defining "accredited investor" to generally include: banks; savings and loan
associations; insurance companies; employee benefit plans; private business development
companies; insiders of the issuer of the securities; any individuals whose individual net
worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of the purchase exceeds
$1,000,000; and any person with individual income of greater than $200,000, or $300,000
joint income with a spouse, in each of the two previous years).
194. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b)(1), 230.505(b)(1). Rule 505(b)(1) incorporates by
reference the requirements of Rule 502, and Rule 502(b)(1) mandates the disclosure to nonaccredited investors of various financial and non-financial information for offerings made
under Rules 505 and 506. Id.
195. HAZEN, supra note 163, § 4.20[l]. Section 4(5) (formerly denominated Section
4(6)) of the Securities Act also covers offerings of the kind exempted under Rule 506, see
supra note 186, but became outdated and superfluous when the more detailed safe harbor
provisions of Rule 506 were adopted. See COX ET AL., supra note 141, at 286 ("Section 4(6)
reflected congressional dissatisfaction with the state of limited offering exemptions in the
early 1980s. The SEC responded with the adoption of Regulation D, rendering the statutory
exemption of little, if any, use today."); Gary M. Brown, Securities Act Registration
Exemptions, in 1 UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS, 209, 217 (Practising Law Institute
2009) ("Among other things, Regulation D incorporates the accredited investor concept of
section 4(6) into a more useful exemption, making the free-standing statutory section largely
superfluous.").
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offering that is exempt under its provisions. 196 Like Rule 505, Rule 506
specifies that no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors may
purchase the securitiesl 97 and requires the same affirmative disclosures to
all non-accredited investors.19 8 Consistent with its roots in Section 4(2),
Rule 506 requires that that each non-accredited investor or the nonaccredited investor's "purchaser representative" meet a minimum
sophistication requirement or that the issuer "reasonably believes"
immediately prior to making a sale that each non-accredited I urchaser or
purchaser representative meets that sophistication requirement.
The most serious obstacle to using Regulation D to exempt
crowdfunded offerings from registration is its overall prohibition of general
solicitation and advertising.200 In fact, "[t]here is no greater impediment to
the ability of small companies to raise capital under the securities laws."20'
The ban on general solicitation and advertising is a substantial obstacle
because the SEC has interpreted this restriction very broadly by construing
"'general solicitation' to include offers to any person with whom the issuer,
or the issuer's agent, has not had a prior relationship."202 Rules 505 and 506
196. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
197. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i); see also supra note 193 and accompanying text
(regarding the parallel requirement in Rule 505).
198. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b), 230.506(b)(1); see also supra note 194 and
accompanying text (regarding the parallel requirement in Rule 505).
199. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (requiring that each non-accredited investor, or his or
her purchaser representative, have "such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,"
or that the issuer "reasonably believe" that the purchaser meets that requirement).
200. See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 11 ("The SEC's ban on general advertising
and general solicitation in private offerings . . . eliminates the potential of the internet to
attract investors . . . .").
201. Id. at 36; see also sources cited infra note 357 (arguing for dismantlement of the
ban on general solicitation and general advertising). This prohibition also applies to the
private offering exemption under Section 4(2), discussed supra Part III.A.2.a. The only
transactional exemptions that are not subject to this restriction are the intrastate offering
exemption under Section 3(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (2006), Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §
230.147 (2011), and Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263, discussed infra Part III.A.2.c.
202. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 41 (citations omitted). In examining a case
where offerors engaged in a general solicitation by sending materials to an unknown number
of people with whom the offerors did not have a pre-existing relationship, the SEC stated:
These persons were selected only because their names were on lists that were
purchased or created by Kenman. Although the make-up of the lists may indicate
that the persons themselves have some degree of sophistication or financial wellbeing, utilization of lists of thousands of persons with no pre-existing relationship
to the offeror clearly does not comply with the limitations of Rule 502(c) on the
manner of solicitation.
In re Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-21962, 32 SEC Docket 1352-1 (Apr. 19,
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completely prohibit general solicitation and advertising.20 3 Rule 504 permits
this manner of offering only if the issuer complies with applicable state law
204
that provides adequate investor protection.
20
5
In almost all cases, crowdfunding websites exist to invite the general
public-the crowd-to help fund small business ventures.206 Their purpose
is to allow ventures to access capital that they would not be able to access
without using the crowdfunding website. If ventures seeking funding were
able to raise the necessary capital from those with whom they have a prior
relationship, they have no need for crowdfunding. Thus, the nature of
crowdfunding requires the use of general solicitation and advertising.
Screening devices, such as password-protected access to the crowdfunding
website, are impractical in this environment. Accordingly, the typical
crowdfunded venture is precluded from using the exemptions under Rules
505 and 506. Exemption under Rule 504 may be available, but only if the
issuer's offering meets the state law exemption requirements set forth in
Rule 504(b)( 1).20' Assuring compliance with Rule 504 for a crowdfunded
venture is not straightforward. It may be difficult to determine the states in
which crowdfunding interests are offered and sold, and assuming that the
applicable state laws meet the proper threshold level of investor protection,
1985).
203. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 505(b)(1), 506(b)(1).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1). Rule 504(b)(1) requires that the issuer comply with
state laws compelling public filing or delivery of disclosure documents before the sale of
securities or that the securities be sold exclusively according to state law exemptions that
allow for general solicitation to accredited investors. Id.
205. When this article was in draft form, we noted that one crowdfunding website,
PROFOUNDER, only allowed investors who were invited by the small business owner seeking
the funding. In that case, the crowdfunding website's primary function is to market the small
business's products and performing administrative work. Although the website facilitates
fundraising by giving the small business owner a platform from which to promote the
business, ProFounder's fundraising strategy is not based on allowing the small business
owner to access more sources of capital; it is based on giving the small business owner a
more effective strategy for tapping those resources. For Entrepreneurs:FAQs, ProFounder,
www.profounder.com/entrepreneurs/faqs (last visited Sept. 1, 2011). The ProFounder
principals were forced to redesign the ProFounder business model after a recent cease and
desist order from the California Department of Corporations regarding ProFounder's status
as an unlicensed broker dealer in the state. See Angus Loten, Crowd-Funding Brings
Unease, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529
70203611404577042333598282986.html?mod=WSJ SmallBusiness LEADNewsCollection
(last visited Dec. 26, 2011). The current version of the website has more of an educational
and supportive mission. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, PROFOUNDER,
https://www.profounder.com/faq (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
206. See Belleflamme et al., supra note 3, at 5 ("Raising funds by tapping a general
public (or the crowd) is the most important element of crowdfunding. This means that
consumers can volunteer to provide input to the development of the product, in this case in
form of financial help.").
207. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1).
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the cost of complying with multiple state laws could be high, if not
prohibitive.
The ban on general solicitation and advertising is a veritable
showstopper for ventures contemplating the use of a Regulation D
exemption for crowdfunding or other Internet offers and sales. However,
the ban is not the only obstacle that issuers face in exempting crowdfunded
offerings from registration under Regulation D. The thirty-five purchaser
limit under Rules 505 and 506 also is an impediment. Information available
on crowdfunding websites leaves open the possibility that each venture will
be funded through the purchase of interests by more than thirty-five entities
and individuals.2 09 We can safely assume that many, if not most,
purchasers of crowdfunding interests are not accredited investors (i.e.,
many or most are neither institutional investors nor high-net-worth
individuals). If more than thirty-fivedistinct non-accredited investors
purchase crowdfunding interests in a particular venture, the offering would
not qualify for an exemption under Rule 505 or Rule 506.210 Even if fewer
than thirty-five non-accredited investors were to acquire crowdfunding
interests in an offering meeting the general solicitation and advertising
requirements, preparation of the disclosure documents required for nonaccredited investors under Rules 505 and 506 likely would be costprohibitive.21 1
An additional hurdle exists with respect to complying with the
sophisticated investor requirements in Rule 506. It is unlikely that all
purchasers of crowdfinding interests-as members of an undifferentiated
Internet-based crowd-would meet the sophistication standards or have
access to a qualified purchaser representative.
For these reasons, Rules 504, 505, and 506 are ill suited to exempt
small-dollar-value Internet offerings to the masses from the registration
requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. Regulation D fails to
provide a viable exemption option for crowdfunded businesses.

208. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Enters Cease and Desist
Order in Connection with Online Campaign to Buy Beer Company, June 8. 2011, available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-122.htm (describing alleged violations of
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act in connection with the online solicitation of pledges for up
to $300 million to purchase the Pabst Brewing Company).
209. For example, a crowdfunded venture that has a target goal of $15,000 and provides
information on rewards for contributions in $10, $30, $50, and $100 increments may require
as many as 1,500 investors to reach the funding target. If an individual was allowed to
contribute less than $10 (for example, if the minimum contribution is $1), it is possible that
there could be as many as 15,000 investors involved in reaching the venture's funding target.
210. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
211. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2). In some instances, the disclosure may require the
same kind of financial non-financial information contained in a registration statement.
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c. Regulation A
Regulation A exempts offerings not exceeding $5,000,000 within a
twelve-month period, provided that the issuer offers the securities using an
offering statement on Form 1-A, a filing similar limited registration
statement, and an offering circular, a disclosure and selling document
similar to the traditional Section 10 prospectus that forms a part of the
registration statement in offerings registered under the Securities Act. 2 12
The offering circular is a "rather full disclosure document . . . complete

with financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, filed and reviewed by the SEC in a manner similar to
the filing and review of registration statements."213 Absent from Regulation
A, however, are the prohibitions against general solicitation and
advertising, limitations on the number of investors, and investor
qualification standards.214
Although Regulation A alleviates many of the burdens imposed by
Regulation D and has been used for at least one early Internet-based direct
public offering, 2 15 the expense of producing the offering circular, in
addition to the costs associated with state securities law compliance, makes
this exemption too costly for many crowdfunded ventures.216 Therefore,
Regulation A fails to provide a practical exemption from federal securities
laws for crowdfunded ventures.

212. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252-253; HAZEN, supra note 163, § 4.17[l].
213. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 28 (citations omitted); see also Campbell,
supra note 146, at 105 ("Although less extensive than the corresponding disclosures required
in a prospectus in a registered offering, the narrative disclosures in an offering circular are
substantial." (footnote omitted)).
214. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251. Rule 251 acknowledges that the exempted offering is a
"public offer or sale of securities." Id. Therefore, there is no need to limit general solicitation
and advertising, assess accredited investor status or examine investors' sophistication
because the exemption presupposes a public offering.
215. See Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups:It's Time For The Securities And
Exchange Commission To Approve A Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 101
(2011).
216. See Campbell, supra note 146, at 105-10. In 1997, the average cost of a
Regulation A offering was $40,000 to $60,000, and the average cost of a registered offering
using Form S-1 was between $400,000 and $1,000,000. HAZEN, supra note 163, § 4.17[1].
Although mini-registration under Regulation A costs less than a registered offering, the
expense of a Regulation A offering will often still be more than the amount of capital that
the crowdfunding venture seeks to raise. Thus, "the Regulation A procedure 'has for the
most part become too cumbersome and expensive for small financings in an enterprise's
early years."' Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 28 (quoting Julian M. Meer, The Private
Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act - A Study in Administrative and
JudicialContraction,20 SW. L.J. 503, 504 (1966)).
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3. Whose Conduct is Regulated?
The analysis in the two preceding subparts of Part III.A does not
directly address the question of who, in a crowdfunded offering, is subject
to the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. 2 17 It is
important to address this part of the regulatory equation as a predicate to an
evaluation of both the benefits and burdens of U.S. securities regulation in
the crowdfunding context and the desirability and efficacy of any
adjustments that may be made to the existing regulatory framework to
better serve the policy objectives applicable to securities offerings under the
Securities Act. This subpart engages that analysis as it relates to the
registration requirement under the Securities Act.2' 8
As earlier noted, Section 5 regulates the offer and sale of a security. 219
Different categories of persons with different roles in securities transactions
are recognized under the 1933 Act as persons who may offer or sell
securities. Paramount among them is the issuer. As a general matter, the
issuer must register securities for offer and sale.220 Section 2 of the 1933
Act defines an issuer as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any
Under this vague definition, either the crowdfunded
security . . . .
venture or a crowdfunding website that promotes a crowdfunded venture
could be an issuer. In SEC v. Murphy,222 the Ninth Circuit offered that, for
purposes of determining the issuer of securities in a limited partnership, the
issuer was the "entity about which the investors needed information.",22 3
The court limited its guidance in Murphy to situations involving limited
partnerships and left for another day the issue of whether additional
individuals or entities with information material to the investment decision
would be a securities issuer.224 This definitional guidance may best support
217. The analysis also does not address the potential effects of applicable liability
provisions under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
218. In limiting our analysis here to matters under the Securities Act, we recognize that
we fail to address other important potential roles that crowdfunding websites may occupy in
securities transactions. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 32-51 (analyzing crowdfunding
websites as potential exchanges, brokers, or investment advisors); Hazen, supra note 7, at
15-16 (analyzing the status of crowdfunding intermediaries); Bradford, Peer-to-Peer
Lending, supra note 7 ("If the sites are offering securities, the sites themselves could be
brokers, or even exchanges, within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act.
Alternatively, it is at least possible that crowd-funding sites are investment advisers subject
to regulation under the Investment Advisers Act.").

219.

15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).

220. 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) ("Any security may be registered with the Commission . . . by
filing a registration statement in triplicate, at least one of which shall be signed by each
issuer. . . ." (emphasis added)).

221.

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4).

222.
223.
224.

626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 643-44.
Id. at 644.
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labeling the specific crowdfunded venture as the issuer. That result seems
intuitively correct, because a profit-seeking crowdfunder needs information
about the venture being funded to assess the desirability and financial
promise of an investment in that venture.
The conclusion that specific crowdfunded ventures are Securities Act
issuers, however, does not foreclose the conclusion that crowdfunding
websites also may be issuers. In fact, decisional law explicitly recognizes
the possibility that multiple entities may act as "co-issuers."225 For example,
the concept of co-issuers was implicitly recognized in Howey, where the
Court found that two affiliated companies violated Section 5 by offering a
land sales contract and a related service agreement for that land.22 6 Coissuer status among affiliates was also implicitly recognized in SEC v.
Edwards, a case involving a corporation and its subsidiary that sold
payphones and offered a five-year leaseback and management agreement in
conjunction with the sales.2 27 Thus, where affiliated companies act together
to offer or sell an investment contract that constitutes a security, both
entities will likely be considered co-issuers of those securities.
However, in many crowdfunding arrangements, the crowdfunded
venture and the crowdfunding website are not affiliated. This should not
make a difference in whether the two are offering and selling securities for
purposes of the Securities Act. The D.C. Circuit's opinion in SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc.22 8 provides limited support for the proposition that two
unaffiliated entities working together to offer a security will be similarly
regulated for purposes of the Securities Act's registration requirements. In
Life Partners, Life Partners, Inc. ("LPI") offered viatical settlements 229 to
investors and, along with Sterling Trust Company, an independent escrow
agent acting for LPI, performed post-purchase administrative functions to
ensure that investors collected on the settlements. 2 30 The court determined
that all prongs of the Howey test other than the "efforts of others" prong
225. SEC v. Datronics Eng'rs, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 937 (1974). Datronics was an engineering company that spun off unregistered shares of
nine new merger-corporations. Id. at 252-53. The court determined that "[c]learly, in these
transactions the merger-corporation was an issuer; Datronics was a purchaser as well as a coissuer ..... Id. at 254. In fact, the 1933 Act definition expressly recognizes the possibility
of more than one issuer. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
226. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
227. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391 (2004).
228. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
229. Viatical settlements are financial arrangements through which an investor
purchases an interest in the life insurance policy of a terminally ill individual (typically an
AIDS patient) at a twenty to forty percent discount. Id. at 537. This arrangement provides
the patient with cash, and the investor's profit is the difference between the discounted price
paid for the policy and the death benefit collected from the insurer. Id.
230. Id. at 540.
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were satisfied. 2 31 An important aspect of this decision as it relates to those
regulated under Section 5 of the Securities Act is that the court analyzed the
efforts of two unaffiliated entities together.23 2 Specifically, the court
recognized that two separate entities can work together in such a manner
that their functions are inseparable for purposes of determining whether a
security is being offered. Because investors would need information about
both parties, each must comply with the Securities Act's registration
requirements. Both parties, even if unaffiliated, should be treated as coissuers where their efforts are inseparable and integral to the offering or sale
of the contract, transaction, or scheme that constitutes a security under the
Securities Act. Accordingly, in some circumstances, crowdfunded ventures
and crowdfunding websites may be acting in concert in a manner that
makes them co-issuers.
An alternative to characterizing the crowdfunded venture and the
crowdfunding website as co-issuers is to treat the crowdfunded venture as
an issuer and the crowdfunding website as an underwriter. "Underwriter
status subjects applicable parties to the provisions of Section 5 and results
in liability exposure for material misrepresentations and nondisclosures
The Securities Act includes a
contained in the registration statement."2
definition of "underwriter":
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation
in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking ... 234
This definition encompasses any party "who offers or sells for an issuer
Courts have generally followed the
in connection with a distribution."
Second Circuit's reasoning in Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, which states that
a distribution is synonymous with a "public offering," as that term is
defined in Ralston Purina.23 6 In other words, if investors in an offering need
the protection of the Securities Act, the offering is a distribution. Someone
who offers or sells securities for an issuer in that offering, or who
participates in that offer or sale, is an underwriter under the Securities Act.
A common function of crowdfunding websites is to provide each featured
crowdfunded venture with access to a base of investors that may be willing
231. Id. at 542-45.
232. Id. at 546.
233. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAWS 175-76 (5th ed. 2009).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l 1) (2006).
235. COX ET AL., supra note 141, at 339.
236. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466-67 (determining that the
"public offering" issue is "dispositive of the question whether petitioners 'purchased ...
with a view to ... distribution"').
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to purchase interests in that venture and to assist in promoting the venture
to those potential investors. In this sense, crowdfunding websites perform
much the same traditional function that investment banks play when they
serve as underwriters in prototypical underwritten public offerings: the
identification of potential investors and the promotion of the issuer and the
securities being offered and sold.2 37 These crowdfunding websites
apparently offer or sell securities for an issuer-the crowdfunded venturein that offering (or at least participate in that offer or sale).
Of course, investment banks serving as underwriters in public offerings
typically act as conduits for securities distribution by purchasing the
securities from the issuer and reselling them to the public. But activity as a
conduit for the securities is not required; activity as a promoter is sufficient
to establish underwriter status. In SEC v. Chinese ConsolidatedBenevolent
Ass 'n,238 the defendant association merely solicited purchase orders for the
securities and engaged in limited ministerial activities in connection with
the sale of Chinese government bonds, yet the court ruled that the defendant
was an underwriter. The court referenced the relevant language from the
Securities Act:
[T]he words "[sell] for an issuer in connection with the distribution of any
security" ought to be read as covering continual solicitations, such as the
defendant was engaged in, which normally would result in a distribution
of issues of unregistered securities within the United States. Here a series
of events were set in motion by the solicitation of offers to buy which
culminated in a distribution that was initiated by the defendant. We hold
that the defendant acted as an underwriter.239
The offering-related tasks that the association undertook in Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Ass'n were similar to tasks that crowdfunding
websites perform. As an underwriter, the crowdfunding website could be
240
liable for Section 5 violations, even if it is not a co-issuer.

237. We note that people who perform these functions also may be deemed finders,
who may be classified as brokers for purposes of the Exchange Act. See Bradford, supra
note 4, at 33-43; Hazen, supra note 7, at 16; Brumberg, Mackey & Weil, P.L.C., No-Action
Letter (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/
2010/brumbergmackey051710.pdf; see also John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the
Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the
Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 861, 897-920 (2005) (describing the role
and legal status of finders in securities offerings). We also note that crowdfunding websites
may perform additional functions (including post-sale administrative functions) that are not
easily classified as underwriting or finding services. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note
230 (describing this kind of activity in the Life Partnerscase).
238. 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941).
2 39. Id.
240. Accord Hazen, supra note 7, at 15-16.
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The doctrine of participant liability, as fashioned by judicial decisions,
supports regulation of the conduct of both the crowdfunded venture and the
crowdfunding website under the Securities Act as offerors or sellers of
securities. Under this doctrine, Section 5 liability attaches to an individual
or entity that has a "significant role" in the offer or sale of securities.24 ' A
"significant role" has been defined to "include one who is both a 'necessary
participant' and a 'substantial factor' in the sales transaction."242 Where an
offering participant is both a necessary participant and a substantial factor
in an offering that violates Section 5, that participant is liable for the
violation. This liability apparently is a form of underwriter liability, because
an individual or entity who has a "significant role" in an offering is a
participant in a distribution of securities by an issuer and, therefore, an
underwriter.243 Under participant liability, there is no question that Section
5 compliance and liability will attach to both the crowdfunded venture and
the crowdfunding website. Both are necessary participants in the offering;
there would be no offer or sale of a crowdftunding interest without the
crowdfunded venture, and the crowdfunding website is the essential vehicle
for the offer and sale of the crowdfinding interests. Moreover,
crowdfunding websites may be involved in the distribution of the
crowdfunding interests offered on their sites in many ways other than as a
fundraising host site for crowdfunded ventures. Examples of this
involvement include: screening the projects prior to offering the investment
to the public,2 " making promotional videos or designing individual web
241
serving as conduits for invested
pages for the crowdfunded ventures,
funds, 24 6 collecting cash from the crowdfunded venture and distributing it to
investors in accordance with the profit-sharing or revenue-sharing
components of the crowdfunding interests promised to investors at the time
241. SEC v. Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 906 (quoting SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 652 (9th
Cir. 1980)).
242. Id.
243. See SEC v. Allison, No. C-81-19 RPA, 1982 WL 1322, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
1982) ("When, as in this case, a defendant's actions were necessary to and a substantial
factor in an illegal securities distribution, the defendant is a participant and thus an
underwriter irrespective of the defendant's intent." (citing Murphy, 626 F.2d at 648-50)).
244. For example, MicroVentures pre-screens all business ideas to evaluate whether the
business meets the criteria to be listed on the site. See Investors: Frequently Asked
Questions, MICROVENTUREs, http://www.microventures.com/investors/faq (last visited Dec.
26, 2011). Some factors include the company's business plan, business experience of the
company's leaders, how the business will use the funds, and the risk to investors. Id.
245. ProFounder, for example, formerly created individual fundraising websites to
market the business ventures that were selected for funding. For Investors: How it Works,
PROFOUNDER, http://www.profounder.com/entrepreneurs (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
246. Microfinancing enterprises, such as Kiva, match investors' funds to
microfinancing institutions in less developed countries, which provide funding to the
principal. How Kiva Works, www.kiva.org/about/how (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
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the interests were purchased,247 and performin accounting and other
ministerial functions for crowdfunded ventures. 24 Both the crowdfunded
venture and the crowdfunding website are substantial factors in the sales
transaction because both work together to provide potential and actual
investors with a financial interest in the underlying venture. In the
prototypical crowdfunding model, the principals behind the crowdfunded
venture create and manage the business or project needing funds while the
crowdfunding website attracts investors, supports them in their chosen
investments, and administers the relationship between the crowdfunded
venture and its investors. 24 9 The doctrine of participant liability supports
imposing the requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act on both
crowdfunded ventures and crowdfunding websites.
Finally, we note the possibility that crowdfunding websites could be
brokers, investment advisors, exchanges, another form of intermediary, or
investor fiduciaries under federal or state securities laws. 25 0 We have left
the analysis of those possibilities to others.25 1
B. Policy Underpinnings
The system of regulation described above serves two overarching
policies: protecting investors and maintaining market integrity.252 These
policies are effectuated principally through doctrinal rules that provide for
mandatory disclosure and liability for noncompliance, material
misstatements and omissions, and fraud. However, Congress and the SEC
also have used substantive regulation of constituents and conduct to

247. Appbackr facilitates the development and sale of newly created mobile apps on the
Apple App Store. Appbackr, like most crowdfunding sites with revenue-sharing or profitsharing arrangements, acts as the intermediary between funders and principals. See How
Does it Work?, APPBACKR, http://www.appbackr.com/static/learnMore (last visited Dec. 26,
2011) ("We act as the intermediary between developers and backers.").
248. Fansnextdoor, which seeks investments from fans to fund creative ventures, retains
3% of the funds raised, for which it provides "webmastering services, web maintenance,
rewriting and translations [EN-FR] when it is necessary." What is fansnextdoor?,
FANSNEXTDOOR, http://en.fansnextdoor.com/help/how-it-works (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
Additionally, Fansnextdoor states that "[w]e . .. also . . . adjust at a certain level the steps of
project creators, and .. . help you communicate during and after the project. . . ."Id.
249. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 7, 218, 237.
251. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 4, at 32-51 (discussing the status of crowdfunding
websites under federal securities laws).
252. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
385 (5th ed. 2010); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, PortableReciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903, 94144 (1998).
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effectuate investor protection and maintain market integrity, particularly
since the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.253
Registration is the vehicle for mandatory disclosure under the Securities
Act. Liability results from a failure to register offers or sales of securities
and from fraudulent or other objectionable activities (e.g., material
misstatements or omissions in registration statements and prospectuses) in
connection with the registration requirement.254 Congressional and SEC
rulemaking and decision-making under the Securities Act focuses on
supporting investor protection and market integrity in this context. For
example, the SEC's general exemptive authority under the Securities Act is
subject to the requirement that the exemption be "necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, and . . . consistent with the protection of investors. 2 55
The Securities Act also imposes market-oriented requirements on the SEC's
rule-making authority. 256
The various types of statutory and regulatory exemptions under the
Securities Act are rooted in different subsidiary policies consistent with the
protection of investors and markets. For example, as the Court recognized
in
257*
in the Ralston Purinacase, it appears that Congress intended Section 4(2)
to allow for offerings that are limited in character in a way that makes the
Securities Act's registration and liability protections unnecessary for
maintaining adequate investor and market protections:

253. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The Securities Act..
was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning
public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing."); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139,
142-43 (2006) (describing substantive regulation under Sarbanes-Oxley). Mandatory
disclosure serves to inform investor decision-making and enhance the efficiency of the
market. See HAZEN, supra note 163, at 168-69; Ripken, supra,at 145 ("For the last seventy
years, federal securities legislation in general has consistently relied on the philosophy of
disclosure as the primary tool for protecting investors and regulating the securities market.").
254. See supra notes 137-42.
255. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2006).

256. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking
and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition
to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.
Id.
257. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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The legislative history is of little help except insofar as the general tone
may be set by the House Committee's reference to this exemption as
permitting "an issuer to make a specific or an isolated sale of its securities
to a particular person," and to the exemption generally as directed to
transaction "where there is no practical need for [the bill's] application or
where the public benefits are too remote." 258
Section 3(b) is founded on different objectives, however. It seeks to
encourage capital formation through small offerings likely to be used to
finance small ventures:
A perennial conundrum of the securities laws is how to treat small
businesses fairly. Historically, considerable evidence has demonstrated
that a substantial proportion of securities fraud is committed by the
promoters of new, speculative firms. To fully exempt small business from
the reach of the securities laws would deprive investors of protection in
some of the instances where investors need protection most. On the other
hand, there is no question that when small firms issue new securities they
pay a proportionately higher price for underwriting compensation (the
primary expense), accounting, legal, and filing costs than larger
businesses. For some small firms, the costs of a public securities
distribution are prohibitive. Unless it is national policy to give the large
business firms advantages over the small in capital formation, it is
essential to create compensatory programs to stimulate the financing of
small firms.259
By its express terms, Section 3(b) is constrained by the overall policy
aims of the Securities Act. Section 3(b) only authorizes the SEC to adopt
exemptions for offerings with an aggregate value of $5,000,000 or less, and
only "if it finds that the enforcement of this title [the Securities Act] with
respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering." 2 60 Regulation A is an example of
SEC rulemaking that effectuates these purposes. Regulation D, which relies
on both Section 4(2) and Section 3(b) of the Securities Act for its statutory
authority, encompasses the underlying policies of both sections by
efficiently combining and enhancing earlier registration exemptions
adopted under Sections 3 and 4 of the Securities Act.26 1 Where does
crowdfunding fit in?
Crowdfunded offerings, as currently conducted, are not private
offerings; by their nature, crowdfunded offerings are not limited offerings
(in terms of their ability to reach potential investors) and are not isolated
258. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 252, at 395.
259. Id. at 387.

260. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
261. HAZEN, supra note 163, at418-19.
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offers and sales of securities. There may be no practical need for
application of the Securities Act's registration scheme or the registration
regime's public benefits may be too remote for crowdfunded offerings of a
relatively small number of units or offerings that are small in aggregate
dollar value. In other words, registration of crowdfunded offerings may not
be necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
Crowdfunded offerings typically are small in size-with aggregate offering
values significantly lower than the $5,000,000 maximum for SEC
exemptions under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act.262 Accordingly,
considering that the existing regulatory framework is unfriendly to
crowdfunded offerings and assuming that crowdfunding is an activity that is
desirable and consistent with the policies of investor protection and
maintenance of market integrity, it seems appropriate to consider an
exemption from registration for crowdfunded offerings.
IV. EXEMPTING CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS FROM SECURITIES ACT
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Positing that crowdfunding may be desirable and that a registration
exemption may be appropriate, this Part first articulates an argument for
providing a registration exemption for crowdfunding and then proceeds to
propose elements of a possible crowdfunding exemption.
A. Why Consider an Exemptionfor Crowdfunding?
Crowdfunding is a very new corporate finance tool, and existing
applicable law shapes (even when it does not constrain) crowdfunding's
current parameters. Accordingly, a comprehensive analysis of
crowdfunding's current and projected future benefits and costs is not yet
possible. Nevertheless, it is feasible to review some of crowdfunding's
perceived and actual advantages and disadvantages to venturers, investors,
other market participants, and the public at large.
262. Not much empirical data yet is available on crowdfunded ventures and offerings.
However, a recent study by two Belgian business scholars showed that the mean amount of
funds raised by the 33 crowdfunded ventures for which finding data was available was $3.5
million, and the median amount of funds raised was under $29,000. Belleflamme et al.,
supra note 3, at 17 (Table 2).
263. Because "[c]rowdfunding is a market of and for the participants," some traditional
financial intermediaries may be shut out of this sector of the capital formation process.
LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 162. No doubt, however, new support roles for
crowdfunding will develop as the industry matures. Crowdfunding sites like 33needs are
new forms of financial intermediation. See Belleflamme et al., supra note 3, at 4. We make
no attempt here to assess the various social and economic tradeoffs among transaction
participants that inevitably will occur as crowdfunding further develops. See generally
LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 167-72 (describing a few ways in which traditional
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1. Perceived and Actual Advantages of Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding may solve a key problem that small businesses have in
funding their operations: locating a sufficient number of potential and
actual investors in a cost-effective manner. Most people seeking to fund
businesses and projects, especially younger entrepreneurs, do not have
relationships with enough entities and individuals to create a stable source
of venture capital without third-party assistance.2 64 In addition, these same
venturers often have few connections to people who can find investors for
them (and even if they do have these connections, they are unlikely to have
the funds necessary to retain these individuals and access their services).265
The Internet has made locating investors much more efficient:
The scalability of classic human-centric networks has hit the skids.
Fortunately, while the Internet has to a large degree exacerbated this
problem, it also holds many solutions. We live in the age where a couple
billion of people use the Internet, and social networking has become part
of our lives, whether it be using Facebook, Twitter, Linkedln, Foursquare,
Blippy, Quora, YouTube, blogging or otherwise. The irony is, many
individuals who have created big social networking presences have a
bigger "Rolodex" than many financiers.266
Crowdfunding enables entrepreneurs to more quickly and easily
identify supporter-investors who are willing and able to fund their
businesses or projects. These investors may be more likely to be engaged
with, and even passionate about, the ventures they are funding than repeat
players in the seed, angel, or venture capital game. Many of these investors
are not otherwise involved in funding business ventures and were an
untapped source of small business capital prior to the advent of
crowdfunding. Crowdfunding gives these investors a way to participate in
corporate finance that they may not otherwise have. Specifically,
crowdfunding provides a new outlet for the capital of ardent consumerfinance professionals could engage with crowdfunding). That analysis must wait for another
day.
264. See Campbell, supra note 146, at 89 ("Usually, company employees do not know
where to find potential investors"). Cf id. at 81 ("[S]mall businesses face daunting economic
and structural conditions when they enter the capital markets. External capital for them is
hard to find and expensive to acquire.").
265. Id at 81. ("The absence of financial intermediation services for small businesses
means that they are almost always on their own to find investors; their small capital needs
mean that their relative offering costs are often sky high.").
266. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 55; see also Belleflamme et al., supra note 3,
at 6 ("[T]he development of Web 2.0 is a critical ingredient that has facilitated the access to
the 'crowd.' Roughly speaking, Web 2.0 is a Web-as-participation-platform that facilitates
interaction between users. This structure is crucial for entrepreneurs to be able to easily
reach networks of investors or consumers." (footnote omitted)).
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investors on the Internet, where these potential funders spend much of their
time. Because of their particularized interest in the ventures they choose to
fund and their Internet savvy, investors in crowdfunded ventures may
choose to fund businesses and projects different from those funded through
more traditional capital-raising methods. 2 67 These crowdfunded ventures
may be more welfare-enhancing or more successful in their relevant
product or service markets than businesses and projects funded through
standard venture capital financings.268
Crowdfunding also has the potential to help stimulate the economy
through the efficient financing it provides to some small businesses. Small
businesses have the capacity to be an engine of economic growth by
creating jobs-and providing hope. 2 69 However, the difficulty that small
businesses have in funding their operations has worsened as a result of the
current economic crisis.2 Crowdfunding may help generate the capital
small businesses need to commence or continue operations, which in turn,
fuels economic growth. For example, veteran crowdfunding site IndieGoGo
is among the participants in Startup America, 2 7 1 a White House initiative
267. See Belleflamme et al., supra note 3, at 28 ("Compared to other means of
financings, crowdfunding opportunities exhibit several important differences that are likely
to affect risk-return profile of investors and motivations for providing money to crowdfunders.").
268. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 55 ("[W]ith the hyper-awareness and
immersion that comes from using these modem [social networking] tools, many individuals
in the crowd have a much better chance of screening and picking the best and most
interesting new projects."); Belleflamme et al., supra note 3, at 28 (Crowdfunding "is a
unique way to validate original ideas in front of a specifically targeted audience. This may in
turn provide insights into market potential of the product or service offered.").
269. See Campbell, supra note 146, at 81 (footnote omitted) ("Society needs small
businesses. They are vital to our national economy, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
They account for as much as 40% of our total economic activity and provide consumers with
many of the services and products that are essential in our day-to-day lives."); id. at 84-86
(chronicling the social and economic importance of small business); Orcutt, supra note 237,
at 861-62 (referencing information from the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of
Advocacy); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing The Ban: It's Time To Allow General
SolicitationAnd Advertising In Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2004) ("Small
businesses play a pivotal role in the United States economy. 'They are the foundation of the
Nation's economic growth: virtually all of the new jobs, 53 percent of employment, 51
percent of private sector output, and a disproportionate share of innovations come from
small firms."' (footnote omitted)); Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Crowdfunding Promoted to
Help Small Businesses, FISCAL TIMES (Apr. 17, - 2011), http://www.thefiscal
times.com/Articles/2011/04/17/Crowdfunding-Promoted-to-Help-Small-Businesses.aspx
("President Obama launched Startup America to encourage entrepreneurship, stressing that
small businesses traditionally have been the engine of job creation, and Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke regularly talks up his concern for small businesses and keep
tabs on small business funding.").
270. See Lewis, supra note 269.
271. See Colleen DeBaise, Kickstarting Entrepreneurship with "Startup America,"
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that features small business as a driver of economic recovery in the United
States.272
2. Perceived and Actual Disadvantages of Crowdfunding
Currently, "crowdfunding is in a very early and noticeably unsettled
state."273 Comprised of a rapidly changing set of Internet business models,
crowdfunding may be less transparent and more intangible to investors and
regulators. Promoters of crowdfunding interests often are anonymous
individuals and unknown entities. Moreover, in its prevalent current form as
a small business start-up financing method, crowdfunding shares many of
the overall negative attributes of small business and start-up capital
formation.274
There are many traps for the unwary in this relatively new, rapidly
developing, faceless transactional environment. Small businesses,
especially start-ups, fail at a relatively high rate, and investors are likely to
lose all of their investment.275 In fact, it may be easier for investors who
WSJ.coM (Feb. 1, 2011, 11:40 AM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/in-charge/2011/02/01/kick
starting-entrepreneurship-with-startup-america/.
272. See Angus Loten, 'Startup America' Embraces Crowd-funding, WSJ.COM (Apr.
22, 2011, 1:34 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/in-charge/2011/04/22/'startup-america'embraces-crowd-funding/; see also Lewis, supra note 269.
273. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 71.
274. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge The Small Business Capital
Barrier?,2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 58-64 (1998) (summarizing many of these
attributes).
275. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 180-81 ("The risk-reward curve in the startup
world is quite well established. . . . At the risk of sounding too general, a lot of time most of
the investment is lost . . . ."); id. at 58 ("Companies with small capitalizations present
disproportionate risks of . .. business failure"); Brian Headd, et al., What Matters More:
Business Exit Rates or Business Survival Rates?, 3, http://www.ces.census.gov/docs/bds/
Exit%20Rates%20or%20Survival%20Rates.pdf ("The one-year survival rates for
establishments born to firms started in 2004 was 76.4 percent and the five-year survival rates
for establishments born to firms started in 2000 was 50.7 percent." (footnote omitted)). The
U.S. Small Business Administration cites to the following findings about the survival of new
firms, based on the same data used by Headd, supra:
Seven out of 10 new employer firms last at least 2 years, half at least 5 years, a
third at least 10 years, and a quarter stay in business 15 years or more. Census data
report that 69 percent of new employer establishments bom to new firms in 2000
survived at least 2 years, and 51 percent survived 5 or more years. Survival rights
were similar across states and major industries. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on
establishment age show that 49 percent of establishments survive 5 years or more;
34 percent survive 10 years or more; and 26 percent survive 15 years or more.
U.S. Small Bus. Admin., FrequentlyAsked Questions: Advocacy: the Voice ofSmall
Business in Government, SBA.Gov, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/sbfaq.pdf (last

934

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:879

lack corporate finance expertise or knowledge of relevant industries to lose
their savings through online investments.2 6 The SEC provides specific
guidance to retail investors engaging in online trading:
Online trading is quick and easy, but online investing takes time.
With the click of a mouse, you can buy and sell stocks .

. .

. Although

online trading saves investors time and money, it does not take the
homework out of making investment decisions. You may be able to make
a fast trade, but making wise investment decisions takes time. Before you
trade, know why you are buying or selling, and the risk of your
investment. 277
Moreover, the Internet may over-inform and, as a result, obfuscate or
bury important information in connection with securities offerings.2 78 The
Internet's capacity for encouraging suboptimal decision-making and the
perceived higher probability of investor losses are real concerns. However,
the Securities Act is not designed and does not exist to protect all investors
from losing their money in all circumstances; the Securities Act is not an
insurance policy against investor losses. 279 An insurance olicy of that kind
is neither realistically possible nor universally desirable. 2
visited Dec. 26, 2011) (answering the question: "What is the survival rate for new firms?").
276. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 180 (noting that people commonly are
concerned about "unsophisticated investors losing all of their money" in crowdfunding
interests); Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and The Internet: Rethinking The Regulation of
Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 37-38 (1998)
("With the increase in the number of active investors on the Internet comes a corresponding
increase in potentially unsophisticated investors. . . . Because fraudulent issuers may sell
securities with greater ease over the Internet, these investors are at risk." (footnote omitted));
Fisch, supra note 274, at 58 ("[R]isks may be magnified by Internet-based securities
transactions. The low cost and wide distribution of Internet offerings makes the Internet an
easy vehicle for fraudulent securities transactions." (footnote omitted)).
277. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Online Investing, INVESTOR.GOv, http://www.
(last
investor.gov/researching-managing-investments/investing-your-ownlonline-investing
visited Dec. 26, 2011).
278. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its
Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 419 (2003) ("Studies show
that at some point, people become overloaded with information and make worse decisions
than if less information were made available to them." (footnote omitted)).
279. See, e.g., In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th
Cir. 2009) ("The securities laws are not meant to 'provide investors with broad insurance
against market losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that
misrepresentations actually cause."' (citation omitted)); Margaret V. Sachs, Materialityand
Social Change: The Case for Replacing "the Reasonable Investor" with "the Least
SophisticatedInvestor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REv. 473, 485 (2006) (noting that
the materiality standard applicable to liability actions under, among other provisions, Section
17(a) of the Securities Act bases investor protection on the reasonable investor-"someone
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A more specific
concern is W
the capacity for fraud in crowdfunding.2 81
Fraud protection is a focus of the Securities Act, and the Internet is a
common vehicle for securities fraud.282 Additional regulation is unlikely to
significantly change this. As a result, the SEC has directed efforts toward
investor education. For example, the SEC has a web page devoted to
Internet fraud.283 Also, small businesses may be disproportionately involved
who grasps market fundamentals").
280. The law's protection of people who unwisely part with money varies depending on
context, and is based on a balancing of relevant policy interests. For example, crowdfunding
advocates and analysts note the lack of parallel regulation of crowdfunding, gambling, and
charitable solicitations, each of which may result in the loss of some or all of the funds
conveyed by the people providing money. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 179-80
(noting that people can gamble away $5,000 without question, but cannot similarly invest
$5,000 because of existing "American SEC regulation"); Angus Lotan, Crowd-FundSites
Eye Boom, WSJ.coM (May 12, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274
8703806304576245360782219274.html ("Until now, U.S. regulations permitted these
[crowdfunding] sites only to facilitate donations-not purchases of equity stakes."); Gus G.
Sentementes, Crowdfunding Allows Everyone to Be an Arts Patron, BALT. SUN (June 13,
2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-06-13/business/bs-bz-crowdfunding-websites
(describing
charitable
-20110613_1_arts-organizations-crowdfunding-arts-spending
fundraising through crowdfunding and noting that "[flederal regulations prohibit fundraisers
from using the websites to sell shares in projects to entice investors looking for a financial
return").
281. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 180 (indicating concern about
crowdfunding's "potentials for fraudulent fund raising activities"). See generally Stephen
Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal,88 CALIF. L. REv. 279,
308 (2000) ("Allowing truly unsophisticated investors to purchase securities of small
speculative businesses, however, may lead to both mistake and fraud.").
282. Gregory C. Yadley, General Solicitation: Looking for Funds in all the Wrong
Places, 70 FLA. B. J. 80, 81 (1996) (describing concern about securities fraud in
"cyberspace"); Jake van der Laan et al., Identifying Internet Mediated Securities Fraud:
Trends and Technology, WEBSCIENCE.ORG, 2 (Apr. 2010), http://journal.webscience.org
/367/2/webscil10 submission_71.pdf ("Over the last number of years North American
securities regulatory agencies have noted a material increase in the number of securities
fraud cases mediated through the internet." (footnotes omitted)). This issue is not new.
Thirteen years ago, a respected securities law scholar made the following observations,
which continue to be true today:
Internet offerings present the risk of fraud. The media have publicized the
popularity of the Internet as a tool for fraudulent transactions generally, and
although Internet offerings are in their infancy, dishonest promoters have been
quick to capitalize on the Internet's potential for cheating investors. The SEC has
already identified and prosecuted promoters in connection with a variety of
fraudulent Internet offerings, including pyramid schemes, false promises and sales
of nonexistent securities.
Fisch, supra note 274, at 80 (footnotes omitted).
283. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Internet Fraud, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/
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in securities fraud.2 84 The SEC has recognized and reacted to the capacity
for fraud in the market for securities of small businesses.285 However, this
enhanced potential for small business fraud does not mean we should ban,
thwart, or unduly constrain securities offerings by small business issuers,
even if those offerings occur over the Internet:
Small companies have been responsible for a large proportion of the
instances of investor fraud. By allowing small companies to make Internet
offerings will we be giving the green light to the scam artists? No doubt
more will try. Better investor education and stronger enforcement efforts
should make the increase in fraud bearable, however. Moreover, the
increase in fraud will be offset by the increase in legitimate business
activity stimulated by the reduced costs of raising capital for many of our
most innovative and productive companies.286
Given the prospect of investor losses resulting from small business
failure and fraud and in spite of the potential capital formation efficiencies
and other benefits it may create for small business, crowdfunding may, if
unregulated or under-regulated, foster a lack of trust in the securities
markets (or at least the crowdfunding component of those markets).
Investor losses and fraud, as well as inconsistent business practices, may
contribute to perceptions that the crowdfunding market is dishonest or
corrupt. Any perception of market unfairness or distrust may have serious
effects on investor confidence and investment behavior:
In order for the securities markets to work, it is critical to maintain
investor trust in the integrity of the market because this trust is the
foundation on which the markets are built. Without a broad-based investor

investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm(last modified Feb. 1, 2011).
284. See Choi, supra note 276, at 29; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The
Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 537 (1998);
Fisch, supra note 274, at 58; David B. Guenther, Note, The Limited Public Offer in German
and U.S. Securities Law: A Comparative Analysis of Prospectus Act Section 2(2) and Rule
505 ofRegulation D, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 871, 908 (1999).
285. See Bradford,supra note 145, at 30.
286. Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost OflPOsDepresses Venture Capital in the United
States, 1 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 369, 379 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also Bradford, supra
note 145, at 30 ("There may be more fraud in small offerings, or at least proportionately
more, but that does not refute the basic argument: as long as many small offerings are
legitimate, there is some offering amount below which registration, or any conditional
exemption, is inefficient." (footnote omitted)); id. at 34 ("The SEC's concern with microcap
fraud is laudable, but the Commission should not penalize all small business issuers for the
misdeeds of a few. The answer to fraud lies in aggressive use of Rule 1Ob-5 and other
antifraud rules, not in a prophylactic bar that ensnares even the smallest, least sophisticated
businesses.").
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perception of legitimacy, people will not invest in the market, but put their
money elsewhere, in "gold or real estate, or under their mattresses."287
The relative ease with which an unsophisticated investor may lose
money in investments with small business issuers, the high rate of securities
fraud in the small business context, and the anonymity of the Internet may
give us pause about extending exemptive relief to crowdfunded offerings.
However, crowdfunding has the capacity to fuel small business growth and
satisfy the demand for a securities market that serves the everyman.
Moreover, crowdfunding is a social and economic force not to be ignored:
"Just how encompassing crowdfunding is, speaks to the enormity of its
potential for economic and social impact. In the same way that social
networking changed how we allocate time, crowdfunding will change how
we allocate capital." 2 88 Accordingly, we believe that crowdfunding should
be encouraged and crowdfunded offerings should be exempt from
registration under the Securities Act; however, because it comes with both
positive and negative consequences, a crowdfunding registration exemption
should be cautiously pursued and appropriately tailored to accentuate the
positive and minimize the negative.
B. The Contours ofa Possible CrowdfundingExemption
In an effort to take away unnecessary legal and regulatory barriers to
crowdfunding while, at the same time, maintaining investor and market
protections, we begin by establishing foundational principles and
considering appropriate rulemaking options and processes. With these
principles, options, and processes in mind, we then outline the possible
parameters of a crowdfunding exemption from registration. The remainder
of this Part sets forth those principles, options, processes, and parameters as
a basis for further dialogue and action.
1. Foundational Principles
Although the following overlapping principles may seem simple and
obvious, we consider each to be of importance in fashioning appropriate
changes to crowdfunding regulation:
*
*
*
*
*

287.
288.

Limit investor risk;
Optimize fraud protection;
Enhance informational transparency;
Foster standardization of disclosures and enforcement;
Constrain regulatory costs; and

Ripken, supra note 253, at 194 (footnote omitted).
LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 1.
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Minimize costs to issuers and investors.289

The first three of these principles derive directly from the policies
underlying the Securities Act described in Part III.B. As corollaries of the
Securities Act's investor protection and market integrity maintenance
objectives, these principles are central values for any variance in the current
securities regulation scheme. Among other things, the mandatory disclosure
rules exist to promote transparency for the protection of investors, prevent
fraud, and promote the perception (if not the reality) of fair and honest
markets.290 Moreover, the three initial principles go to the heart of the
matters described in Part IV.A.2 as regulatory concerns applicable to
crowdfunding: specifically, unease about the relationship between Internet
offerings and investor losses and higher probabilities of fraud in small
business capital formation. 2 9 1 Transparency-meaning not necessarily more
disclosure, but more targeted, simple, easy-to-access disclosure-should
support more effective transmission of information to the potentially
inexperienced or less experienced Internet investors that are among those
attracted to crowdfunding.292 In addition, transparency should help limit
cases of fraud to crowdfunded businesses that are affirmative bad actors
whose conduct is not likely to be deterred by ex ante regulation and must be
punished by ex post enforcement.
The fourth value, standardization, is closely related. Standardization of
disclosures through mandatory disclosure requirements and enforcement is
an efficient way to accomplish the first three principles, but especially
relates to and operates hand-in-hand with transparency. In addition,
disclosure and enforcement standardization is a potential source of
economic efficiencies that may help constrain costs incurred by market
participants (the fifth and sixth principles in our list of foundational
principles) while also protecting investors:
289. We note that Woodie Neiss, a member of the Small Business and Entrepreneurship
Council Advisory Committee, suggested four similar principles as a basis for crowdfunding
regulation in a December 2010 letter appended to the Final Report of the 2010 Forum on
Small Business Capital Formation. See SEC, 2010 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS
FORUM

ON

SMALL

BUSINESS

CAPITAL

FORMATION:

FINAL

REPORT

(June

2011),

http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor29.pdf.
290. See Judge Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning ofSchmiergeld: A Look at the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 272
(1998) ("The securities laws have long been a model for appropriate government regulation.
They are largely statutes that mandate transparency. Full and fair disclosure is the general
concept underpinning these laws."); Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO
L. REv. 2321, 2345 (2007) ("A great deal of securities regulation revolves around mandatory
disclosure, in order to promote transparency of financial markets.").
291. See supra Part IV.A.2.
292. See Lotan, supra note 280 (noting that "crowd-funding sites advertise start-ups to
a broad audience, and could easily attract people who shouldn't be involved in speculative
offerings").
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Absent standardization of disclosure requirements, such as those provided
by the SEC, there will remain "grave uncertainty about outcomes because
such matters as intent and negligence need to be sorted out in court." By
contrast, the securities regulatory system is standardized, which makes
disclosure more efficient.
The standardization of disclosure and enforcement rules is a central
benefit for securities regulation and a key reason why private
contracting cannot as efficiently protect the investor.293
Although a number of respected law and economics scholars advocate
voluntary disclosure rather than mandatory disclosure,294 because
standardized disclosures exist for issuers outside the crowdfunding context
(e.g., through registration requirements and Regulations D and A29 5), we
also include standardization as a foundational regulatory principle here. We
want to be clear, however, that fostering standardization does not
necessarily require homogenization or the imposition of weighty line-item
disclosure rules.
Finally, our listed foundational principles recognize that it is important,
in our attempt to both promote crowdfunding and protect investors and
markets, not to impose on regulators or market participants a level of cost
that is perceived to be so prohibitively high that the proposed regulatory
solution is not feasible for regulators or represents a disincentive for issuers
or investors. The cost of complying with regulatory change is an important
consideration. Certain costs, such as the resources devoted to completing
necessary filings and disclosures, are obvious.296 However, the assessment
of those costs in a crowdfunding context may be difficult, especially in light
of crowdfunding's varied forms and relatively short track record. Moreover,
current regulatory cost-benefit analyses for federal agency rulemaking may
not be as broadly applicable as they should be or, when applicable, may be
unavailing for other reasons.29 7 Accordingly, additional means of assessing
293. Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities
Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 356-57 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
294. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis,
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1024-25 (2000) (setting forth both neoclassical economic and
behavioral aspects of the mandatory disclosure debate).
295. See supra notes 143, 194, 213 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
297. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002) (defending the use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory
rule-making, but criticizing its misuse and suggesting alternative approaches); Susan RoseAckerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 335 (2011) (critiquing and suggesting revisions to the existing means of
engaging cost-benefit analysis); Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: HaphazardDiscounting
and the Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1505 (2010)
(criticizing regulatory cost-benefit analysis on the basis of, among other things, time
indeterminacy).
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the costs and benefits of a crowdfunding exemption should be identified,
explored, and potentially used to supplement existing methods.298
These additional cost-benefit analyses should take account of the costs
associated with the fact of a change in legal rule, in addition to costs
associated with the specific substantive attributes of the proposed new
rule.29 9 These legal transition costs frequently go unnoticed and
unaccounted for in assessing the overall costs associated with a new legal
rule:
What has been overlooked is the friction inherent in change itself
Whatever one's normative perspective, a legal system will incur costs
simply in adjusting to the existence of a new legal norm. These will arise,
for instance, from the need to learn about the content of new law, as well
as from an increased risk of uncertainty about its meaning and effect.
Changes in legal directives likewise will compel intraparty adjustments
and have subtle effects on interparty relationships forged around the old
legal order. Indeed, transition costs reflect a systemic phenomenon.
Although in differing degrees, they will arise from legal change in all
fields, with all lawmaking structures (whether statutory, administrative, or
judicial), and for all types of reform (regulatory, deregulatory, and so

on). 300

These costs are inevitable in any legal rule change, but can be greater in
some rule changes than others.3 0 ' In the case of a possible new
crowdfunding registration exemption, legal transition costs may be borne
by regulators, issuers, investors, and others and may include:
*

those associated with lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals,
principals of crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures, and
others learning about the new exemption;
* those borne by people with knowledge of and experience with the old
rule (trading off their own knowledge of SEC registration exemptions
for an untested new exemption) and by people who struggle with
interpretive questions about and possible gaps in the new registration
exemption regime;
* lost opportunities resulting from a lack of clarity or precision in the
expression of the new exemption;
* the expense of creating new forms and business practices to comply
with the new exemption;
* those incurred by legal actors who misunderstand the new exemption
and act in reliance on that misunderstanding in creating faulty new
298.

See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 145, at 30-33 (modeling the costs and benefits of

registration or partial regulation, and exemption).
299. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L.
REv. 789 (2002) (cataloguing and categorizing legal transition costs).
300. Id. at 793.
301. Id. at 816.
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forms or business practices, in giving erroneous advice on the
application of the new exemption, or in conducting their
crowdfunding businesses; and
those suffered by the SEC in administering and applying the new
exemption.302

The SEC can reduce these types of costs by constructing any new
crowdfunding exemption in a way that minimizes variation from the
existing registration exemption scheme and otherwise decreases
uncertainties and misunderstandings. Use of the existing exemptive
framework and prevailing industry norms and best practices, for example,
may best serve this purpose.
2. Rule-Making Options and Processes
Having established the basic values that should underlie any proposed
changes to crowdfunding regulation, we next consider the options and
process for creating a new registration exemption for crowdfunding
consistent with those values. Several possible paths are immediately
apparent. Because we assume that profit-sharing crowdfunding interests are
securities under the Securities Act and that regulatory change is required to
we excluded
serve our interest in facilitating crowdfunded offerings,
maintenance of the status quo (in which no registration exemption is
available) as a possible regulatory option.
The first possible regulatory option is to treat crowdfunding as a
completely new and distinct business model and regulate it separately from
other capital formation activities. The most simple and comprehensive way
to accomplish this would be for the SEC to provide, by regulation or
interpretive guidance, that crowdfunding interests are not securities for
purposes of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.0 4 Absent further
regulation or guidance, this approach would render the registration
requirement in Section 5 of the Securities Act 305 inapplicable to
crowdfunded offerings. This method of facilitating crowdfunding would
minimize costs to issuers, investors, and the SEC because it leaves any
regulation of crowdfunding to the market. This course of action may,
however, present more perceived or actual risk to funders and create moral
hazard by decreasing protections against fraud (since antifraud statutes and
302. Id. at 850-52 (describing and illustrating the various forms of legal transition costs
on which this list is based).
303. See supra Part IV.A.
304. See supra Part II. Although the definition of a security differs under the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act, we believe that treating the two definitions similarly in this
context makes sense because the current definitions are substantially the same, and the
regulatory environments are interwoven. See supra note 141.
305. See supra notes 133, 135 and accompanying text.
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rules under federal securities regulation would be inapplicable).30 6
Moreover, while the effects of market self-regulation on informational
transparency and the standardization of disclosure and enforcement may be
theorized in this context, they are unclear.
One way to address the uncertainties created by deregulating the offer
and sale of crowdfunding interests under the federal securities laws is by
regulating those transactions under another one or more existing areas of
law (e.g., through gambling regulation or the regulation of charitable
donations 307 ) or by regulating them under a new scheme of regulation
created especially for crowdfunding. If this option were pursued, existing
regulatory frameworks would likely have to be significantly modified to
comply with our articulated principles of regulatory change, and creation of
a new regulatory scheme consistent with these principles would consume
significant time and resources. Both of these options-modifying and using
a pre-existing regulatory scheme and creating a new regulatory schemeincrease regulatory costs and costs to issuers and investors. These options
also would have to be designed and implemented to optimize fraud
protection, enhance informational transparency, and foster disclosure and
enforcement standardization.
The more promising regulatory option is to clarify that some or all
crowdfunding interests are securities under federal law and to work within
the existing securities regulation scheme to fashion a registration exemption
that is consistent with the foundational principles articulated in Part IV.B. 1.
First, by working in the existing regulatory framework, we can constrain
both regulatory costs and costs to issuers and investors. Second, through
customized provisions, the architects of the exemption can work to limit
investor risk, optimize fraud protection, enhance informational
transparency, and foster disclosure and enforcement standardization. This
seems like the best approach.
Of course, this path is not as easy as it sounds. As we noted earlier,
crowdfunding incorporates a variety of different business models, 308 and it
306. Prosecutors, federal agencies, and aggrieved investors still may have paths to
enforcement under state securities (or "blue sky") laws and regulations as well as federal and
state fraud law outside the securities fraud context. See David M. Cielusniak, Note, You
Cannot Fight What You Cannot See: Securities Regulation on the Internet, 22 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 612, 634-35 (1998). These other fraud actions may or may not have desirable
remedies or advantageous claim elements for public enforcement authorities or a particular
aggrieved private investor, however. By cutting down the number of potential enforcement
avenues, perceptions of both investor protection and market integrity may suffer.
307. For a brief "take" on the gambling and securities analysis of crowdfunding on the
music industry, see Tim Kappel, Comment, Ex Ante Crowdfunding and the Recording
Industry: A Model for the U.S.?, 29 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 375, 382-83 (2009); see also
Hazen, supra note 7, at 1,20 n.29.
308. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also LAWTON & MAROM, supra note
4, at 201 ("It's worth noting that there are many categories of crowdfunding, and it would
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is still a new phenomenon with uncertain advantages and disadvantages.30 9
Experience in crowdfunding is dispersed and disparate, and no individual or
group of individuals in the SEC is likely to have sufficient expertise to
piece together an appropriate exemptive solution:
[R]egulators and policy makers are just waking up to crowdfunding.
There have been a limited number of regulatory shut-down events in the
recent years, but by and large regulators need to play catch-up.

. .

. [Tihe

velocity of this space is accelerating, and even for someone who spends
full-time looking into is [sic], it's impossible to keep track of it all. How
people who have other roles and responsibilities . . . could properly

regulate crowdfunding is hard to imagine. 310

Accordingly, it seems prudent to engage those involved in
crowdfunding in the regulatory discussions in a meaningful way before
Congress passes legislation that legalizes crowdfunded offerings of
securities or the SEC publishes a rule proposal as part of the notice-andcomment process required under the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").3 1 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro embraced this idea in
connection with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act and is again embracing it in the context of reforms to small
business capital formation (of which crowdfunding regulation may become
a part).3 12 We endorse this approach.
not be appropriate to apply the same disciplines across them all.").
309. See supra Part W.A.
310. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 198. Although two industry researchers
suggest self-regulation of crowdfunding, see id. at 198-202, we are not persuaded that this is
a wise course of action given the foundational principles we articulate supra Part IV.B. I.
Our discussion supra in Part IV.B.2 is instructive in this regard. Even these two researchers
offer that regulators should be involved in the process. Id. at 198-99. The question is who
controls, monitors, and enforces the regulation.
311. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). Under the APA, "[a]fter notice required by this
section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity
for oral presentation." Id. at § 553(c).
312. See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 11 (noting that, in conducting a review of the
regulation of small business capital formation, the SEC "will gather data and seek input from
many sources, including small businesses, investor groups, the public-at-large, and a new
Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies that the Commission is in the
process of forming, so that we consider a variety of viewpoints."); Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Society of American Business Editors and Writers
(Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch040811mls.htm (reflecting on
regulatory efforts undertaken by the SEC under Dodd-Frank and noting that "[q]uality rules
can't evolve in a Washington bubble. We understand the impact our actions can have on the
financial markets, on companies large and small, and on individual lives. This understanding
drives us to hear a wide range of opinions, and consider every view as we move forward to
carry our mission .... ).
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The involvement of crowdfunded businesses, promoters, and investors
in the creation of a crowdfunding exemption may have more than a
substantive advantage, however. There may be positive cognitive effects to
employing industry participants in the regulation process. There is a proven
value, in the form of buy-in, when members of a group are asked to comply
with direction by members of their in-group.' In addition, introducing
non-SEC personnel into the regulatory decision-making process may
mitigate the effects of bounded search, bounded rationality, groupthink, and
other operative behavioral biases.3 14 A regulatory process that achieves
buy-in to mutually acceptable rules and engages fresh, proactive decisionmaking by incorporating regulated businesses into the rulemaking process
early may better serve the foundational principles of limiting investor risk,
optimizing fraud protection, enhancing informational transparency, and
standardizing disclosure and enforcement. Positive effects on costs also
may result.
While potentially advantageous for all these reasons, integrating
crowdfunding representatives with regulatory authorities in the rulemaking
process must be done carefully to avoid both inefficiencies in process
(which may result from the involvement of disparate industry participants
in the regulatory process) and the perceived or actual co-opting of
regulators by industry-so-called regulatory capture. 1 We have considered
the use of a wiki or other form of crowdsourced regulatory initiative as a
potential solution to these problems and as a possible cost-saving device,
but we have concluded that this vehicle, taken alone, likely would not
provide the kind of detailed input, debate, and discussion that group
working meetings featuring simultaneous (or perhaps, synchronous)
interaction conducted in person or electronically would provide. Further,
we have determined that it may be prudent to introduce the collaboratively
developed regulatory response as a pilot program for further study after a
period of years. While this would increase regulatory costs, it seems
unlikely, given the fast rate at which crowdfunding is developing, that an

313. See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE 145-46 (2010).
314. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 72-73 (2003).
315. See Choi, supra note 276, at 40 ("Regulators may also be subject to possibilities of
regulatory capture from the very groups that the regulators seek to regulate."); Saule T.
Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward FinancialIndustry Self-Regulation,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 463 (2011) ("Regulatory agencies in charge of the financial services
sector often display strong signs of industry capture and increasingly engage in
nontransparent and highly informal rulemaking that falls outside public scrutiny and tends to
favor the industry."). See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, FilterFailure,
and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010) (describing and illustrating the role of
information capture in agency rulemaking and enforcement).
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initial regulatory response-even with industry input-would be able to
316
fully anticipate the actions and reactions of industry participants.
3. Substantive Elements of a Proposed Exemption
In a July 1, 2010 petition to the SEC, the Sustainable Economies Law
Center ("SELC") advocates adopting a rule that would provide a
registration exemption for offerings up to $100,000, with a maximum of
$100 per investor.317 With crowdfunded ventures as the target of this
exemption, the petition specifies that the entity seeking funding, which the
SELC refers to as the "offeror," must be an individual residing in the
In its
United States and may only have one offering open at a time.
will
promote
an
exemption
that
such
asserts
petition, the SELC
entrepreneurship and allow small businesses to raise equity rather than
debt. 9 According to the SELC, these are both desired consequences, as
they will stimulate economic recovery.32 0 The SELC petition concludes by
noting that Section 3(b) and Section 4(2) are possible sections under which
the rule could be promulgated, but acknowledges that if the rule is created
under Section 4(2), no general solicitation or advertising will be
permitted.32 1 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro references the petition in her
316. We note that two prominent scholars have made similar suggestions for
comparable and related reasons in the weeks immediately preceding the final editorial
changes to this article. See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Professor John C. Coates IV,
John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School), at 5, availableat
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfn?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=l d24b42
e-3ef8-4653-bfe8-9c476740fafa (suggesting a "sunset provision" for capital formation
proposals in various pending bills, including the Senate crowdfunding proposals, "such that
the proposals would by their terms last for no more than two or three years"); Roberta
Romano, Regulating in the Dark (Dec. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1974148 (arguing for, among other
things, congressional and regulatory re-examinaton and re-evaluation of decisions to adopt
proposals embodied in crisis legislation). Specifically, Professor Romano contends that
Congress and regulators should provide "procedural mechanisms that require automatic
subsequent review and reconsideration of those decisions, along with regulatory exemptive
or waiver powers that create flexibility in implementation and encourage, where possible,
small scale, discrete experimentation to better inform and calibrate the regulatory
apparatus." Id. at 3-4.
317. Petition from Jenny Kassan, Co-Director, Sustainable Econs. Law Ctr. to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec'y Sec. Exch. Comm'n (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/petitions/201 0/petn4-605.pdf.
318. Id.

319. Id.
320.
321.

Id.
Id.
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April 2011 letter to The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, Chairman of the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the U.S. House of

Representatives. 32 2
The SELC petition caught the attention of both crowdfunding advocates
and the SEC,3 2 and it has served a valuable role as a catalyst of efforts for
change.324 Although the petition includes certain key tenets of a possible
crowdfunding exemption, it represents a unilateral, incomplete response to
the issues crowdfunding raises under the Securities Act. In particular, while
the inclusion of aggregate and per-investor caps has merit as a riskreduction device, we are believe that more can be done in this regard at a
relatively low cost to the SEC, issuers, and investors. Moreover, the SELC
proposal does not address fraud protection, informational transparency, or
disclosure and enforcement standardization. As discussed in Part IV.B.1,
we believe that these principles are central to an appropriate, successful
regulatory response. For example, we find it unacceptable for a
crowdfunding regulatory exemption to leave those who invest a small dollar
value in a venture to fend for themselves, 32 5 even though we allow
individuals to bear the loss of the same amount of funds in gambling
transactions or as financially ill-advised charitable donations or consumer
purchases.32 6 Generally, that approach would neither promote nor support
market integrity, even if investor protection is deemed unnecessary for
those advancing a small amount of capital. Finally, the SELC petition does
not address a means for engaging crowdfunding participants in the process
of constructing the exemptive proposal 327 (although crowdfunding issuers,
investors, and advocates would have the opportunity to participate in the
overall regulatory effort through the notice-and-comment process under the
APA, as earlier noted 3 28).
We also are aware of three other proposals (one being an article
cautioning against the establishment of a crowdfunding exemption without
322. See Issa Letter, supra note 9.
323. Id.
324. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 52-53 (citations omitted).
325. See Bradford, Crowdfunding Blog, supra note 9 ("Obviously, an offering isn't any
safer just because a large number of people invest small amounts. And people who invest
small amounts aren't necessarily sophisticated enough to protect themselves; in fact, smaller
investors are probably less sophisticated on average."). we are mindful, however, that the
more limited protections afforded to accredited investors under Regulation D rely on the
ability of accredited investors to bear the potential loss of their entire investment. See supra
notes 193, 198 and accompanying text; see also Bradford, Crowdfunding Blog, supra note 9
(noting that the "argument for an exemption if investors can afford to lose the money isn't as
novel as it sounds. It essentially underlies Regulation D's designation of investors as
'accredited' if they meet specified income or net worth limits.").
326. See supra note 280.
327. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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a mandatory disclosure component), each of which appears in an article
authored by a fellow law scholar at or about the time this article is being
published. 9 Other proposals also have been advanced, and likely will
continue to be advanced, on both formal and informal bases. 3 30 Each
proposal has attributes common to others, and each proponent makes
important arguments. Although we believe there is value in reading and
considering each of these proposals in the regulatory process, we do not
support any of them as a precise template for congressional or SEC
rulemaking.
As earlier indicated in this article, the U.S. Congress has begun to take
action.3 31 Both the bill passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in
November 2011 and the Bill under consideration in the U.S. Senate at the
time this article went to press call for a specific crowdfunding exemption.
Yet, there are significant differences between the two bills. The House bill
sets an aggregate offering limit of $1,000,000 ($2,000,000, if the issuer
furnishes investors audited financial statements) and a per-investor cap of
the lesser of $10,000 or 10% of the investor's annual income.332 The
Senate bill caps the maximum aggregate offering price at $1,000,000 and
sets a per-investor limit of $1,000.33 The Senate bill requires that securities
be issued through an intermediary, but the House bill does not. 334 Both bills
require certain disclosures, restrict resales of the subject crowdfunding
interests, and incorporate "bad boy" disqualifiers.m
Each proposal and bill has merits and flaws, and no doubt each will
develop further after this article goes to press. In our view, however, the
collaborative process we suggest in Part IV.B.2 represents a constructive
and optimal approach to determining the specific terms of a proposed
registration exemption for crowdfunding interests that is consistent with the
329. See Bradford, supra note 4; Hazen, supra note 7; Pope, supra note 215.
330. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 3, 51-56.
331. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. The North American Securities
Administrator Association also has released a proposal through Jack Herstein's testimony in
the December 1 hearings held on S. 1791. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital
Formation While ProtectingInvestors: Hearingon S. 1791 Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (Dec. 1, 2011) (written testimony of Jack E.
Herstein, President of the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. and
Assistant Director of the Nebraska Department of Banking & Finance, Bureau of Securities),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_
id=255al e89-30b9-4036-9560-b4a0db5def80.
332. H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011) [hereinafter H.R. 2930], available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (actual bill text may be accessed by searching for
appropriate bill number).
333. S. 1791, 112th Cong. § 2(3) (2011) [hereinafter S. 1791], available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (actual bill text may be accessed by searching for
appropriate bill number).
334. H.R. 2930, supra note 332.
335. Id.; S. 1791, supra note 333.

948

TENNESSEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 78:879

foundational principles of limiting investor risk, optimizing fraud
protection, enhancing informational transparency, fostering disclosure and
enforcement standardization, constraining regulatory costs, and minimizing
costs to issuers and investors-principles of regulation that we believe will
allow the proper balance of governmental and market-based regulation.336
We also suggest that those engaged in crafting an appropriate exemption
consider proposing a new rule-based exemption using some or all of the
following general substantive attributes:
*
*

*
*

*

336.

Limit and tailor the exemption to Internet offerings;
Do not allow foreign issuers, investment companies, or public
companies (i.e., issuers who do not have a class of securities
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act 337) to use the
exemption;
Permit general solicitation and general advertising;
Limit the aggregate offering price for each crowdfunded venture to a
specified dollar amount (e.g., $100,000, $250,000, or possibly even
lower thresholds for some types of exempt offerings33 ) over a
twelve-month period; 339
Limit the aggregate dollar value of crowdfunding interests that a
single investor may purchase in a single crowdfunded venture (e.g.,
$100 or $250) in a single offering or over a specified period,340 unless
In saying this, we acknowledge that others may have a different set of values,

consistent with the policy underpinnings of the Securities Act, that they desire to promote in
this regulatory process. Regardless, we would hope that the group crafting any exemption in
this area would develop and articulate a set of principles to guide its activities.

337.

15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2006).

338. Regulation A formerly permitted offerings of up to $100,000 with limited required
mandatory disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (1991). Moreover, early guidance from the
SEC's General Counsel noted that small aggregate offering size is a characteristic of a
private placement exempt from registration under Section 4(2). See SEC General Counsel
Letter, supra note 164. Also, we note that one academic proposal would limit the use of an
exemption to "microstartups"-businesses "in which one or two creative people have an
idea for a product or service that can be developed, launched, and marketed for a few
thousand dollars." Pope, supra note 215, at 975.
339. We do not, however, suggest that the SEC consider whether twelve months is the
appropriate aggregation period. See infra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
340. Those crafting the regulatory exemption must be mindful of the relationship
between the per-investor and per-offering caps, because crowdfunded ventures and
crowdfunding websites will not want to trigger registration requirements under Section
12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2006), and Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. §
240.12g-1 (2011). Together they require registration under the Exchange Act if an issuer has
a class of equity securities held by at least 500 people and at least $10,000,000 in total
assets. See Pope, supra note 215, at 996-97. Many business ventures that we envision using
a crowdfunding registration exemption under the Securities Act would not have sufficient
total assets to trigger registration under the Exchange Act. However, regulators must give
attention to this issue.
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the investor is an accredited investor or sophisticated (as those
concepts are defined and used in Regulation D);
Restrict resales of crowdfunding interests;
Compel issuers (both crowdfunded ventures and their promoters,
including crowdfunding website operators 34 1) to file a brief issuer
registration and a brief offering notice with the SEC; and
Mandate that certain limited disclosures, including cautionary
language, be included on the crowdfunding website in a specified
manner and, in some cases, using specific text.

We expect that the precise combination of these attributes that will best
effectuate desired foundational principles will be the subject of significant
discussion and debate among participants in the regulatory process. Our
approach encourages a balancing of issuer, investor, and regulatory
interests in a manner similar to that involved in federal consumer protection
regulation.3 42 The overall analogy to consumer protection is too complex to
explore in any depth here. Suffice it to say, however, that there are both
commonalities and differences in selling securities and other products at
In determining the substantive
similar price points over the Internet.3
341. For this Part IV.B.3, we treat crowdfunding websites as co-issuers for most
purposes. See supra Part I1I.A.3. By imposing regulation on crowdfunding websites as well
as crowdfunded ventures, crowdfunding websites should be incentivized to engage in
rigorous pre-screening of the crowdfunded ventures they host and promote. We note,
however, that for our solution to work in this co-issuer context, a number of details would
need to be addressed. For example, as we note earlier in this list of potential substantive
attributes, any aggregate offering cap would have to apply to each crowdfunded venture, and
not to each crowdfunding website (because there are crowdfunding websites that host and
promote the securities of multiple crowdfunded ventures). Alternatives exist to treat the
crowdfunding websites as brokers, investment advisors, exchanges, or other investor
fiduciaries. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. The issue of how to treat promoters
of small business offerings has been on the SEC's radar screen for quite some time. See
Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 61-63.
342. One commentator explained this balancing well in the context of the consumer
protection regulation of ecommerce transactions:
Government has an interest in ensuring that e-consumer confidence reinforces ecommerce as a viable commercial medium, benefiting both e-businesses and econsumers. . . . Yet, government e-commerce action must be calculated and
targeted, balance market and social policies in the process, take the Internet
mechanism into consideration and not eliminate e-commerce's attractionefficiency, low cost, easily accessible consumer base and the simultaneous nature
of business transactions.
John R. Aguilar, Over the Rainbow European and American Consumer Protection Policy
and Remedy Conflicts on the Internet and a Possible Solution, 4 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POt'Y
1, 10-11 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
343. Securities regulation in the crowdfunding context may be seen as a specific form
of consumer protection, emphasizing investor protection policy over market protection and
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attributes of an appropriate exemption for crowdfunding, we suggest that
rule makers examine the interactions among those attributes in the context
of the policies underlying federal securities regulation while, at the same
time, keeping overall consumer protection principles in mind. The
remainder of this Part IV.B.3 sets forth further thoughts that may be
relevant to a consideration of those interactions.
Ultimately, we are not convinced of the need for Congress to act on a
crowdfunding exemption under the Securities Act (although Congress will
likely need to take parallel action on other securities regulation issues in
Although a thorough
order to effectuate the exemption in full 344).
comparative institutional analysis is beyond the scope of this article, we
note that existing regulation offers ample opportunity for the SEC to act
without a grant of additional congressional authority (and, presumably, at a
lower aggregate cost) and that the SEC's overall competence and relative
independence make it a desirable rule maker in this context.34 5 Specifically,
we contemplate that the SEC would use its exemptive authority under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act346 to promulgate this exemption, which
could be included in Regulation D as, e.g., Rule 504A, or in a new parallel
regulation modeled after Regulation D (perhaps denominated Regulation
CF). The concepts of integration 3 4 7 and aggregation 34 8 applicable to Rule
504 and 505 offerings under Regulation D also would be applicable to
exempt crowdfunded offerings, although we recommend that the SEC
consider shortening the periods for each, consistent with its rule-making
authority under Section 3(b) and Section 28 of the Securities Act. 349 By
working within the existing regulatory framework for Section 3(b)
promotion. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW: 2009-2010 EDITION § 1:1 (West 2009) (noting a common "philosophy that the
government should play a role in assuring that consumers are not unfairly taken advantage of
in the marketplace."). The commonalities between securities regulation in this context and
consumer protection regulation in the crowdfunding context extend to, among other things,
protections against fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and deceptive and unfair practices. See
generally id. at §§ 2:1, 3:1 (describing these regulatory areas under consumer protection
law).
344. See infra notes 388-89 and accompanying text.
345. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the
Right Vehicle for Federal CorporateGovernanceInitiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
225 (2005) (suggesting a framework for a comparative institutional analysis of federal
corporate governance initiatives).
346. See supra note 184.
347. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
349. See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 47-54; Hazen, supra note 7, at 10, n.66.
The SEC proposed shortening the integration window from six months to ninety days in
2007. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act
Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 4516 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/33-8828.pdf.
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exemptions under Regulation D, regulatory costs should be less than if new
regulations were created from whole cloth.
The substantive characteristics set forth above are designed to operate
in the limited context of very small Internet-based offerings for relatively
small U.S. issuers-a context in which crowdfunding has its perceived
maximum net advantages under current circumstances and in which U.S.
law applies. 3 s0 Although the substance of our proposal may be faulted for
representing a somewhat timid response, it is "much better than nothing."35'
We may be wrong, but given the relatively novel nature of crowdfunding
and the existing state of the SEC, we believe that a conservative initial
approach is warranted. 352 There may come a day on which it would be
appropriate to extend a crowdfunding exemption to larger offerings in
wider contexts; however, we are concerned that the multiplicity of
crowdfunding models and flux in current crowdfunding platforms make it
too difficult to fashion a wider exemption that adequately limits investor
risk and optimizes fraud protection. There also may be a future time at
which it would be advisable to initiate an overhaul of all small business
capital formation regulation. The current investor-protection focus of the
SEC and its lack of adequate funding 354 make this an improbable current
objective. Accordingly, as a more limited approach, we suggest an Internet
small issuer exemption that limits the aggregate dollar value of offerings
covered, and we recommend limiting the availability of the exemption to
non-public U.S. issuers that are not investment companies 355 using openaccess websites to enhance their base of prospective and actual funders.
350. See supra Part IV.A.1.
351. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 188 (noting that "from a macro view,
exemptions like this can be counter-productive, and in fact might hold back crowd-funding's
potential").
352. Professor Thomas Lee Hazen takes an even more conservative approach than the
one we suggest here. In general, Professor Hazen does not favor the creation of a new, broad
exemption for crowdfunding. Hazen, supra note 7, at 17-22. However, he does offer that
"[i]n the event that an additional exemption is warranted, it should be conditioned on
mandated disclosures that would give investors the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the
investment." Id. at 22. The type of disclosure Professor Hazen has in mind is disclosure
akin to that provided in a Regulation A offering, a more weighty level of disclosure than we
recommend here. Id at 14-15, 22.
353. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 4, at 93-102 (describing actual and
aspirational attributes of crowdfunding platforms, and noting that the characteristics of a
potential future crowdfunding platform may make regulators "a lot more comfortable," and
better support necessary fraud prevention algorithms).
354. See generally Heminway, supra note 345 (discussing the SEC's investorprotection mission and funding situation in the context of an evaluation of reform efforts at
the SEC).
355. We note that neither investment companies nor public companies can use Rule 504
to avoid registration under the Securities Act and that Rule 505 is not available to investment
companies. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(a), 505(a) (2011); see also Campbell, supra note 146,
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Our focus on open Internet offerings means abandoning Regulation D's
prohibition on general solicitation and general advertising. Commentators
have long argued that the general solicitation and advertising ban is
defective or unnecessary. 35 6 The SEC did, in fact, remove this proscription
in Rule 504 offerings for a seven-year period durinF the 1990s only to
reinstate it because of renewed concerns about fraud.35 There are a number
of potential benefits associated with open websites and the enhanced
information they can provide.358 Moreover, the general solicitation and
advertising restriction is out-of-step with current communication norms,
business practices, and lifestyles.359 The SEC has thus far been reluctant to
take an aggressive view on abandoning this dated proscription, despite its
uncertain purpose and effect.360 We have determined that abandoning
at 103 (noting that "[t]o be eligible for Regulation A, an issuer cannot be a reporting
company under the 1934 Act. The point of this requirement is apparently to force public
offerings by larger, 1934 Act companies onto either S Forms or SB Forms, with their more
extensive disclosure requirements." (footnotes omitted)). While this limitation may not be
essential, see Bradford, supra note 4, at 77-78, we offer it as part of the mix of attributes to
be considered by rule-makers. We believe that regulatory costs are saved by varying the new
exemption little from the existing Rule 504 exemption.
356. See, e.g., Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38
EMORY L.J. 67, 70 (1989) (contending that the general solicitation and advertising ban is
"unconscionably vague" and "broader than it should be"); Sjostrom, supra note 269, at 4
("[T]here is no strong ideological foundation for the ban"); Yadley, supra note 282, at 82.
("Permitting greater use of general solicitation is not likely to diminish consumer protection
or open the floodgates to fraud.").
357. See Bradford, supra note 145, at 19 (summarizing the relevant history); Campbell,
supra note 146, at 97 n.92 (same). Professor Hazen, however, is very wary of delinking
general solicitation and advertising from significant, substantive mandatory disclosure
obligations. See Hazen, supra note 7, at 2, 10, 14, 19, 20. We understand the need for this
linkage in the context of a private offering exemption under Section 4(2) and the related safe
harbor under Rule 506 of Regulation D. However, we are concerned with requiring this
linkage for all Section 3(b) offerings, regardless of offering size and other characteristics and
terms.
358. See Bradford,supra note 4, at 78-79.
359. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of Private Offerings in the
Cyberspace Era: Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37 U. TOL. L. REv.
331, 362 (2006) ("The SEC view of general solicitations and advertising is based on
assumptions about the distribution of information that are inconsistent with post-Internet era
standards of information dissemination and business practice.").
360. Professor Don Langevoort notes this puzzle in one of his articles:
[W]e must ask why general solicitations are barred in the first place-something
on which the Commission has never been particularly forthcoming. One
possibility is simple concern for the statutory language, which speaks in terms of
non-public offerings rather than sales. But there is no obvious reason why
"offerings" must necessarily be given a meaning that precludes public advertising
or mass mailings, and the statutory restraint concern is no longer applicable at all
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general solicitation and advertising prohibitions is appropriate. However, to
the extent that the ban on general solicitation and advertising actually limits
investor risk or fraud, we believe it is important to place a renewed focus on
addressing those values through other, more direct, investor and market
protections.
One way to constrain investment risk is to limit an investor's exposure
to losses in a particular enterprise.3 6 This approach is a form of substantive
regulation and is more than a bit patronizing. A per-investor cap curtails
investor freedom by cutting the investor off from unacceptable losses
before they occur, much in the same way that one might cut off a partygoer
from inebriation by limiting the number of drinks that she may have. We
have very mixed feelings about this aspect of our proposal.
As a result, we recommend limiting any per-investor cap to those
investors who are not accredited or sophisticated. The logistics of
implementing this type of hybrid requirement in crowdfunded offerings will
not be trivial, and the costs may well exceed the benefits. In that event, a
per-investor cap would be an unwise regulatory element. But those costs
and benefits should be weighed in light of an overall proposal for a
crowdfunding exemption. The implementation of a per-investor cap
represents a heavy-handed form of investor protection, and if it is adopted,
offering processes will need to be redesigned or modified. On the other
hand, the nature of the crowdfunding market is such that it may attract
participants who are intent on abusing the privilege of open solicitation and
advertising.3 62 Just as Professor Margaret Sachs suggests reaching out to
protect the "least sophisticated investor" from fraud in inefficient
markets, 363 it may be appropriate in these early stages of crowdfunding
development to extend extraordinary protection to the unsophisticated and

in light of the Commission's new exemptive authority under the Act, which allows
it to eliminate any statutory restrictions it wishes. Another possibility is that the
prohibition is designed to protect the unsophisticated investor who might be
tempted by the promotion into misrepresenting his or her qualifications in order to
take part in the deal. That paternalistic concern is strained on its face; elsewhere,
the Commission has recognized that since no prequalification procedures are fail
safe, all we should require is reasonable belief by the issuer in the offeree's
qualifications.
Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of "Technological
Disintermediation"for UnregisteredOfferings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 1, 24 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see also Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 36-42.
361. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 66-68 (discussing potential exemptions that limit
investor losses to a "tolerable amount").
362. See supra Part IV.A.2; Hazen, supra note 7, at 20.
363. See Sachs, supra note 279.

954

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:879

unaccredited investors in a crowdfunded offering by limiting their capacity
to invest in crowdfunding interests ex ante.
In a similarly over-protective way, restricting the resale of
crowdfunding interests may help constrain fraud, which may be more likely
to occur in resale markets.365 An investor who buys and sells securities in a
resale market may find himself or herself attenuated from an accurate and
complete source of information about the crowdfunded venture or the
crowdfunding interest being offered. Typically, crowdfunding websites are
designed to attract interest in primary offerings conducted over a short,
defined period. Investors advance funds to a crowdfunded venture in order
to achieve a specified funding target by a date certain.366 Currently, most
crowdfunding websites are not built to serve as markets for secondary
offerings or even as hosts for ongoing disclosures that might support an
appropriate secondary market. SEC endorsement of secondary trading in
crowdfunding interests is unlikely in the absence of a reliable means for
market participants to obtain current information about those interests and
the crowdfunded venture.
In practice and in theory, information is very important to investor
protection and market integrity. Investors typically will not fund unknown
risks. 6 Moreover, the regulation of securities offerings provided under the
364. See Hazen, supra note 7, at 20 (raising investor protection concerns based on the
possible nature of crowdfunding investors). An interesting question is whether the perinvestor cap should be an aggregate cap for all of a single investor's crowdfunding
investments (perhaps together with investments made by affiliates and associates) or
whether the cap should only apply to investments in a particular crowdfunded venture.
Professor Steve Bradford posits that the former is more reasonable. See Bradford, supra note
4, at 76. We suggest otherwise, see supra note 340 and accompanying text, but understand
and appreciate Professor Bradford's concern and would reassess this aspect of a possible
exemption in light of other attributes of a specific exemption proposal.
365. In reinstating the prohibition on general solicitation and advertising under Rule
504 in 1999, the SEC noted concern about fraud in the trading markets for securities offered
and sold by issuers under Rule 504. See Bradford,supra note 145, at 19. The risk may have
been overstated or given undue effect in the SEC's decision-making, however. Id.;
Campbell, supra note 146, at 97 n.92.
366. See supra Part II.B.3 (describing this funding model in the context of the
commonality element of the Howey test).
367. This apparently was a further concern of the SEC in its decision to reinstate the
general solicitation and general advertising requirement to Rule 504. See Bradford, supra
note 145, at 19 ("The SEC believed that ... the lack of widely-distributed public information
about companies making Rule 504 offerings, and the freely tradable nature of Rule 504
securities may have exacerbated the opportunities for microcap fraud."). We note that it is
difficult for issuers in this context to constrain resale transactions. However, any regulatory
solution should address the manner in which investor violations of any resale prohibition
impact the issuer's exemption. See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 144, at 54-58 (raising this
issue).
368. This principle can be illustrated simply in a basic discussion of business finance.
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Securities Act reflects the semi-strong version of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis. 36 9 As a result, the Securities Act requires the disclosure
of investor-significant information through mandatory disclosure rules (in
the form of prospectuses, offering circulars, and otherwise in registration
exemptions) and through fraud-protection rules that call for the disclosure
of material information where there is a duty to disclose. 370 Neither
Congress nor the SEC has deemed mandatory disclosure or fraud protection
to be a sufficient regulatory tool without more.3 7 1 Consistent with these
Professor Heminway has been known to begin her first Securities Regulation class of the
semester with a simple statement and question that illustrate this basic point. She says
something like: "I have started a business. Do you want to buy an interest in it?" Students
hesitate, and when she asks why (to the extent they do not offer a reason), they respond with
something akin to: "Well, before I put down my hard-earned money, I would like to know
something about the business." Further discussion illuminates that they want to know about
the finances and operations of the business, as well as the nature of the interests being
offered and where the offering proceeds will go. A well-guided discussion can touch on all
of the areas of mandatory disclosure in a Securities Act registration statement. Of course,
these students have been assigned (and may have read) the introductory chapter of our
casebook as background to this discussion.
369. See Robert A. Brown, FinancialReform and the Subsidization of Sophisticated
Investors' Ignorance in Securitization Markets, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 105, 165 (2010)
("[Miany legal commentators, courts and lawmakers have cited the EMH as a guiding
principle in articulating rules of the architecture of American securities markets. The
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which preceded proceeded
formal development of the theory, have at their heart a desire to disclose to investors
unknown risks." (footnote omitted)); Michael W. Prozan & Michael T. Fatale, Revisiting
"Truth in Securities ": The Use of the Efficient CapitalMarket Hypothesis, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 687, 697 (1992) ("The Commission explicitly adopted the ECMH in its refinement of
the registration process.").
370. See supra Parts III.A.1, 2.
371. In early presentations of this article to faculty audiences, we advocated mere
reliance on antifraud rule protections, suggesting that (with a minimization of investor risk in
other ways) mandatory disclosures in the form of SEC filings or investor information
materials were not needed. After some push-back from those audiences, we rethought the
issue and determined that minimal mandatory disclosures would best serve the policies
underlying the Securities Act and support important related regulatory values. See Cohn,
supra note 150, at 365 ("The impetus for disclosure in the nonregistered setting is
compliance with exemption conditions and effective sanctions."). The exemption could (and
perhaps should) expressly designate the required mandatory disclosures as, individually and
collectively, a prospectus for the purposes of Section 12(a)(2), affording the purchasers of
crowdfunding interests a Securities Act cause of action for material misrepresentations and
omissions. Current law may already afford investors that right. See infra note 374. Professor
Hazen, among others, favors giving crowdfunding investors this right of action. See, e.g.,
Hazen, supra note 7, at 14, 22. Any plan to abandon mandatory disclosure must meet a high
burden of proof, given its centrality to the federal securities regulation scheme.
[A]t the same time that the Internet is increasing the impact of small business
offerings, regulatory reform efforts . . . may be effectively transforming [Internet
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regulatory objectives, and in furtherance of our foundational principles of
enhancing informational transparency and fostering disclosure and
enforcement standardization, we suggest that putative rule makers consider
requiring issuers/offerors to (a) file with the SEC both an issuer registration
form and an abbreviated brief notice of each offering and (b) include
cautionary language and certain other limited disclosures on the
crowdfunding website though which the offering is made.
The important issue in fashioning these filing and disclosure
requirements is balancing the desired level of information against the costs
of producing and disseminating that information.3 72 Indeed, "[t]oo much
complexity at the entrepreneurial level will . . . destroy the exemption's
utility." 3 73 Accordingly, our suggested filing and other disclosure
requirements are intended to be minimal but substantive. At the low dollarvalue level of investment that issuers would be requesting and investors
would be making under the exemption, most of the disclosure requirements
for crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures would be satisfied by
complying with the anti-fraud protections afforded by Section 17 of the
Securities Act and Section 10(b) of and Rule lOb-5 under the Exchange

Act. 374

In that spirit, we envision SEC filing requirements that are simple
notice submissions--one or more forms that would represent a tailored
version of either the Form D required for offerings under Regulation D37 5 or
offering] regulation ... from a prophylactic disclosure structure to one that merely
reacts to and combats fraud. The original promulgation of the federal securities
laws was based on congressional perception that such a structure was an
ineffective means of regulating the national securities markets. Proponents of
regulatory reform need to explain why technological developments since the 1930s
have rendered that perception obsolete.
Fisch, supra note 274, at 89.
372. Constraining costs to issuers is a foundational principle for our proposed
regulatory solution, as set forth supra Part IV.B. 1.
373. Bradford, supra note 4, at 68.
374. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. We also note the probable
application of Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act to prospectuses used in offerings
exempt under Section 3(b), even in the event there is no express provision in the exemption
itself. See Elliott J. Weiss, Some FurtherThoughts on Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 137, 152 (1996) ("[Mlost important .. . are ... small-scale offerings made pursuant to
section 3(b).. . . [Alt least where securities are sold to the public, section 12(2) applied pre
Gustafson, and section 12(2) would continue to apply."); Natasha S. Guinan, Note, Nearly a
Decade Later: Revisiting Gustafson and the Status of Section 12(a)(2) Liability in the
Courts-CreativeJudicial Developments and a Proposalfor Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REv.
1053, 1069 (2004) ("Section 12(a)(2) liability expressly attaches to Section 3 offerings by
referring to: 'Any person who . .. offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of [Section 31)."').
375. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2011). A PDF version of Form D is available at
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the Small Company Offering Registration form."' For example, the issuer
registration would include basic information about the crowdfunding
website or crowdfunded venture, including information necessary for
locating and notifying the filer and its relevant personnel in connection with
monitoring and enforcement." Similarly, the level of information required
for the notice of each offering would be comparable to that required to
complete a Form 144 under the Securities Act. Logically, the amount of
required disclosure in the company registration and offering notice would
bear an inverse relationship to the aggregate size of the offering and the
dollar value of the per-investor cap.37 However, a certain minimal amount
of information necessary for monitoring and enforcement would be
required as a threshold matter.so
In addition, rule makers should consider requiring the inclusion of
certain cautionary language and other disclosures on websites through
which crowdfunded offerings of securities are made. Professor Steve Choi
aptly summarizes the behavioral psychology basis for these types of
requirements in securities regulation as a means of protecting investors:
One possible method of correcting for behavioral biases is to provide
corrective or cautionary information to investors. If investors view sales
materials too optimistically, then providing the investors more sober
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.
376. The Small Company Offering Registration Form (Form U-7) is available at
http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/scor-forms/.
377. Although registration requirements will not enable the SEC, the Department of
Justice, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation to find every Internet fraudster, we offer it as
a way to ameliorate the effects of the faceless, opaque, remote nature of the Internet. See
Fisch, supra note 274, at 81 ("The power of the Internet to transcend jurisdictional
boundaries suggests . . . that it may be more difficult for victims and regulators to trace the
source of fraudulent offers and obtain legal recourse against wrongdoers." (footnote
omitted)).
378. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(h). A PDF version of Form 144 is available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml44.pdf.
379. Cf C. Steven Bradford, Expanding The Non-Transactional Revolution: A New
Approach To Securities Registration Exemptions, 49 EMORY L.J. 437, 449 (2000)
("Intermediate disclosure rules that do not provide the full benefit of registration, but also
have lower compliance costs, could be economically efficient for all but the smallest
offerings. An incremental system in which the level of investor protection increases as the
size of the offering increases could make sense." (footnote omitted)).
380. We acknowledge that standardized disclosures have a cost to the crowdfunded
venture and crowdfunding website. We believe that these costs are not significant, but we
may be wrong in this regard. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 84-85. A more detailed costbenefit analysis can be made as proposals develop through engagement among the relevant
constituencies. If disclosures necessary to appropriate risk reduction are not cost-effective
for crowdfunding websites, crowdfunded ventures, and crowdfunding investors, then the
exemption we envision here should be abandoned. The adoption of an exemption that will
seldom, if ever, be used is a waste of regulatory time and effort.
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materials on the issuer's business, properties, and financial health may, in
theory, help overcome their overoptimism. Additional information may
serve to educate investors about the potential pitfalls they face in investing
. * . or, alternatively, caution the investors to take extra care in their
investment decisions. If investors are capable of learning, then mandatory
disclosure and legends may work to educate investors, reducing their
behavioral biases.
In a crowdfunding context, these required disclosures could be made on
the web page for each crowdfunded venture. The most critical information
could also be displayed for would-be investors to acknowledge as a
condition to the crowdfunding website accepting their investment funds
(through, e.g., something akin to a click-wrap agreement,382 implemented
through a pop-up window with a check-the-box requirement). Warning and
advisory legends are already used in disclosure rules and exemptions under
the Securities Act. 8 Although many may read over a standard cautionary
legend without heeding or reacting rationally to its content, 384 we believe
that those investing in crowdfunding interests should at least have notice
that their entire funded amount is at risk, that the probability of any return is
remote, and that their interests are illiquid. Discussions among regulators
and those in the industry will help decide whether and how additional
cautions should be issued. This approach represents a minimal and
inexpensive means of promoting investor protection and fosters
transparency and standardization.
381. Stephen J. Choi, BehavioralEconomics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 85, 116 (2006) (footnote omitted).
382. See generally Francis M. Buono & Jonathan A. Friedman, Maximizing the
Enforceability of Click-Wrap Agreements, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 13 (1999), available at
http://jtlp.org/vol4/issue3/friedman.html ("A 'click-wrap agreement' is an agreement,
formed entirely in an online environment such as the Internet, which sets forth the rights and
obligations between parties.").
383. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(b)-(d) (requiring certain statements in communications
used after filing a registration statement that may otherwise be prospectuses within the
meaning of the Securities Act); 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(a)(1) (requiring in a communication
used before the filing of a registration statement "a statement to the effect that it does not
constitute an offer of any securities for sale" so that the issuer will "not be deemed to offer
its securities for sale through that notice"); 17 C.F.R. at § 230.163(b)(2) (requiring issuers to
state that they may file a registration statement with the SEC and directing potential
investors to read the prospectus included in that filing); 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c)(2) (requiring
issuers to state that they have filed a registration statement and directing potential investors
to read the prospectus included in that filing).
384. For a pithy critique of legending requirements (focused on those in connection
with the SEC's 2005 offering reforms), see Choi, supra note 381, at 118-19.
385. Before implementing the legending requirement, however, we suggest that the
SEC study its efficacy. See id. at 128 (suggesting four ways in which the SEC should clarify
and make explicit the assumptions about investors on which its regulatory proposals rest).
Consistent with our foundational principles of constraining regulatory costs and minimizing
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Transparency and standardization, as well as (potentially) investor
protection and fraud prevention, also may be promoted by mandating
certain simple disclosures on the crowdfunding website relating to the
crowdfunding website, the crowdfunded ventures, the interests being
offered, the way in which the offering is being conducted, the ongoing role
of the crowdfunding website after investments are made, and any follow-on
ministerial services that will be rendered, such as delivery of investor funds
to the crowdfunded venture, monitoring of the crowdfunded venture's
operations and financial data, and collection and distribution of profitsharing or revenue-sharing amounts to investors. The major disadvantages
of this type of disclosure requirement are its cost and potential to stifle
efficient, desirable innovation. 16 Again, however, we posit that the required
disclosures could be minimal given the relatively low amount at risk, if low
caps on both the aggregate offering price and per-investor funding are
instituted. More disclosure is not necessarily more protective to investors.387
We suggest an assessment of investor needs, a review of industry best
practices, and a touch of aspirational imagination to identify the nature and
extent of appropriate, efficient, and efficacious mandatory disclosure
requirements in the crowdfunding context. We would hope that the result
would be a competition for investors based on, among other factors, the
quality of the crowdfunding website's disclosures.
Neither the suggested process for regulatory change nor the substantive
recommendations we outline in this article addresses market regulation
issues under the Exchange Act, investment advisory issues under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, the interaction of crowdfunding with
state securities (or "Blue Sky") rules, or the inherent cross-border nature of
costs to issuers and investors, disclosure burdens should not be added unless their benefits
clearly exceed their costs. See id. at 119 (noting that the SEC likely bases its decisions to
impose legends on an "ad hoc basis"); id. at 122 ("[T]he SEC implicitly makes assumptions
about how investors behave"). We acknowledge the possibility that standardization, if taken
too far, can dampen positive entrepreneurial innovation. Bradford, supra note 4, at 85.
386. Professor Alan Palmiter expresses the disadvantages well and advocates that
issuers be permitted to choose the level of disclosure they offer:
The Securities Act often compels issuers to disclose and warrant more than
investors are willing to pay for, driving issuers to avoid mandatory disclosure or to
choose other financing techniques. Disclosure choice in securities offerings
promises to expand the methods and reduce the costs of capital formation by
aligning disclosure (both its contents and methods) with actual investor
information demands, not legislative or administrative assumptions.
Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice In Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 1, 86 (1999).
387. See Choi, supra note 380 ("While more disclosure into the market may help some
investors, the increased information may simply cause others to fall further into the traps of
overconfidence and overoptimism.").
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Internet securities offerings (including crowdfunded offerings). 38 8 We leave
federal market regulation and investment advisory issues to another
commentator or another article. 3 89 As to state securities law interactions, we
believe that the SEC is best positioned to administer and enforce
crowdfunding regulation (given the interstate and international nature of
crowdfunding), which would require federal preemption of state
regulation. 390 Finally, as to the globalization of securities markets and
transactions, we join the growing chorus of voices that urge continued
consideration of a more coherent approach to international regulation and
enforcement in an increasingly global transactional world.3 9'
388. See supra notes 7, 218, 237, 250, 341 (noting these exclusions as well as the
exclusion of other regulatory schemes, such as gambling and charitable solicitation
regulation, from treatment in this article). We also do not address the precise status of
crowdfunding websites for purposes of the overall regulatory scheme under the Securities
Act. See supra note 341. Any crowdfunding regulatory solution, regardless of whether it
follows any or all of the elements of the proposal we set forth in this article, should address
the issue of the regulatory status of crowdfunding websites under all applicable securities
laws. Other authors already are approaching some of these issues. See Bradford, supra note
4, Hazen, supra note 7; Pope, supra note 215.
389. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 32-51. The need for improved regulation of market
professionals extends beyond the crowdfunding context. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson,
Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 191 (2010) ("[A]s
the recent financial crisis has demonstrated, there is much room to improve the regulation of
institutions that intermediate between individual investors and the securities markets. Many
scholars believe that the SEC should increase its oversight of these intermediaries, such as
investment advisors and broker-dealers." (footnote omitted)).
390. Accord Bradford, Peer-to-PeerLending, supra note 7 ("A federal exemption that
does not preempt state law isn't going to accomplish much."). This is not a new suggestion.
Scholars have argued for preemption in connection with existing registration exemptions.
See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 145, at 33-34 ("Small businesses should receive the same
consideration that the 1996 Act gave public companies: the states should be preempted from
requiring the registration of Rule 504 offerings."); Campbell, supra note 146, at 106-110,
119 (describing the high cost of state securities compliance for small businesses using
Regulation A offerings and concluding that "[t]he best way to eliminate state interference is
for Congress to expand the preemption of NSMIA to include securities issued under Section
3(b) of the 1933 Act."); Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules
Respecting CapitalFormation,78 WASH. U. L. Q. 407, 413-33 (2000) (arguing generally for
federal preemption of state securities law regulation of capital formation). But see Johnson,
supra note 389, at 192 (arguing for a return to state regulation "of Rule 506 private
placements by private entities to largely retail investors."). Unlike our proposal for handling
the Securities Act registration exemption, this change would require congressional action.
See Hazen, supra note 7, at 16-17.
391. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REv.
327 (2010) (noting the need for, barriers to, and prospects for international securities
regulation); Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the
Harmonization and CentralizationofInternationalSecurities Regulation, 79 U. CiN. L. REV.
587 (2010) (arguing for reform, harmonization, and centralization of securities regulation);
Stephan J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
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V. CONCLUSION

Crowdfunding is an exciting, dynamic, inclusive capital formation
model for small businesses (and, in some present and envisioned future
forms, for larger business ventures). However, crowdfunded ventures and
crowdfunding websites that offer profit-sharing interests to funders violate
Section 5 of the Securities Act when they offer or sell those interests
without registration or compliance with an applicable exemption.392
Investor protection and the perception of fair and honest investment
markets-key policies underlying the Securities Act-are sources of
concern as the crowdfunding market rapidly develops in the absence of a
clear regulatory framework or response. With the thought of harnessing
crowdfunding's positive attributes and minimizing its potential negative
characteristics, this article suggests a conservative approach to regulating
crowdfunding through a new SEC registration exemption under Section
3(b) of the Securities Act.
Yet, as this article amply illustrates, the exemption process will not be
simple. It will require a delicate balancing of interests among the SEC,
industry participants, and investors. It will involve parallel action by
Congress. This is, of course, not new. The debate over crowdfunding
regulation illustrates the classic tension between regulatory and marketbased solutions to perceived and actual market failures. SEC Commissioner
Troy Paredes states the basic issues well:
Government intervention in securities markets to put information in
investors' hands and to protect investors against corporate abuses serves a
distributional goal by protecting investors against losses. Such
government intervention also serves the larger goal of promoting capital
formation and more efficient and liquid securities markets in that investor
protection regulation can shore up investor confidence in the integrity of
securities markets. Sometimes, though, increased investor protection, such
as through more mandatory disclosure and more aggressive SEC oversight
and enforcement, can impede market participation and thus undercut the
capital formation process and the efficiency and liquidity of securities
markets.
This tension drives the cost-benefit analysis of regulating securities
markets. Regulatory systems that allow for flexible, dynamic financial

markets inevitably come at the risk of investor loss, fraud, and corruption.
Regulators have to exercise restraint and allow for misconduct and abuse
of investors because, at some point, investor protection overburdens
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903 (1998) (proposing "portable
reciprocity" and recommending "a regulatory regime that focuses on regulatory competition
and gives issuers and investors the ability to choose the law that governs their
transactions.").
392. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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financial markets. The question of when it becomes too costly for the
government to protect investors is a fundamental challenge of securities
regulation. 393

The determinations that must be made to resolve this tension are allthe-more difficult in the crowdfunding context because of the way in which
crowdfunding interfaces directly with rapidly changing technology, state
securities regulation, and globalism. We do not have all of the answers to
the questions that may be raised about regulating crowdfunding. However,
we do believe that it is important that the process and outcome of
crowdfunding regulation strike an appropriate balance that both fosters
crowdfunding's promise-as a means of raising investment funds for small
businesses and allowing individual retail investors to access a user-friendly
business finance market-and supports policies and values central to both
securities regulation and crowdfunding's potential ongoing role in smallbusiness capital formation. In that spirit, this article is designed to
contribute positively to the regulatory debate.

393. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy,Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 1006.
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